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Policies that exploit a firm's market power to extract supra-competitive
profits from employees or consumers should not fall within the limits of the
business necessity defense in disparate impact litigation. Even though such
policies can substantially enhance a firm's profitability, profits that are the
byproduct of market failure are less justified than those that are a byproduct of
competition. By enjoining employment and consumer policies that extract
supra-competitive profits disproportionately from racial minorities and other
protected classes, disparate impact law can help make markets both more
competitive and less racially discriminatory.
Imagine that an employer's promotion criteria have been shown to
disparately exclude African American employees from higher-paying jobs
within a company. What standard should a court apply to assess whether the
promotion criteria are justified despite their racially discriminatory impact?' In
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serving as a paid expert witness in Cason v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp. (2001) 3-98-0223
(M.D. Tenn.) and a number of parallel pieces of litigation, discussed infra in Part III, 1 offered
opinions on the scope of the business justification defense in disparate impact cases that directly
relate to the issues discussed in this article.
1. The disparate impact and disparate treatment causes of action have distinct elements.
Disparate treatment litigation challenges employer policies that are contingent on race, sex or
some other protected characteristic. Disparate impact plaintiffs in contrast do not need to prove
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other words, what should be the scope of the business justification defense in
disparate impact litigation? A persuasive answer has eluded both scholars and
judges.2 On the one hand, civil rights advocates have tended to answer this
question by focusing on the term "business necessity," suggesting that any
policy that is not strictly necessary to prevent a firm's bankruptcy is not
justified. 3 Opponents, on the other hand, have tended to focus on the term "job
related" in arguing that any policy that increases a firm's profitability (even
infinitesimally) is justified.4
The conflict over the appropriate scope of the business justification
defense is longstanding. It was at the heart of the stalemate over the proposed
Civil Rights bill that passed both houses of Congress in 19905 but was vetoed
by President George H.W. Bush, who felt that the "business necessity"
definition created a de facto quota employment requirement. 6 The following
year, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which contained
compromise language on business justification. 7 The compromise language
(which was taken word-for-word from the Americans with Disabilities Act),8
however, did little to resolve the dispute. It defined a defendant's policy as
unjustified if "the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is
job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity." 9
Since Congress's passage of the new language, some courts have
continued to allow a broad justification defense. For example, Judge Richard
race-contingent policies. To make out a prima facie case plaintiffs need only prove that a
defendant's policy disparately impacts a protected group. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a - 2000h-6
(2000).
2. Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 643, 655
(2001); see also Steven R. Greenberger, A Productivity Approach to Disparate Impact and The
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 72 OR. L. REV. 253, 257 (1993); Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the
Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean,
74 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1484 (1996).
3. See, e.g., Linda Lye, Title VII's Tangled Tale: The Erosion and Confusion of
Disparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 315, 349
(1998); see also Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 671 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
4. See, e.g., Robert Belton, The Dismantling of the Griggs Disparate Impact Theory and
the Future of Title VII The Need for a Third Reconstruction, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 243, 243-
44 (1990); Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV.
523, 582-83 (1991).
5. S. 2104, 101st Cong. (2d Sess. 1990).
6. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, President's Veto of Rights Measure Survives By 1 Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 1990, at AI. The 1990 bill explained that, in the case of employment practices, the
term "required by business necessity" meant that practices "must bear a significant relationship to
successful performance of the job." S. 2104, 101st Cong. § 3(o)(l)(A). See generally Ian Ayres &
Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word As Red Herring: Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce
Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1485 (1996).
7. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
8. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (1994).
9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (1994).
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Posner has written that disparate impact liability exists to identify situations in
which, "through inertia or insensitivity, companies [are] following policies that
gratuitously-needlessly-although not necessarily deliberately, exclud[e]
black or female workers from equal employment opportunities." ' ° This
formulation resonates deeply with a profitability definition; an employer who
can show it adopted a policy to increase its profits, even infinitesimally,
arguably did not adopt the policy "needlessly." There is of course a huge
difference between Posner's "needlessly" standard and the "business necessity"
definition favored by civil rights advocates. One requires the smallest of
reasons, while the other seems to demand the largest of reasons. 1
The dispute over the appropriate scope of the defense has, however,
masked a deeper consensus about the relevance of profitability. All sides to the
debate have implicitly agreed that policies that produce greater profits are more
justifiable. Civil rights advocates and their opponents disagree about how much
a policy needs to increase profits to provide a defense against disparate impact
liability, with the former saying a lot, the latter saying a little. Nevertheless,
both sides equate more profits with more of a justification, without taking into
account how the profits were extracted.
Figure 1 Pro- and Anti- Competitive Policies





(positively) correlate with justifiability. The problem with the received wisdom
is that it fails to distinguish between pro- and anti-competitive behavior. Figure
10. Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank, 223 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Finnegan v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 1992)).
11. See Ernest F. Lidge, Financial Costs as a Defense to an Employment Discrimination
Claim, 58 ARK. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (discussing the hypothetical example of an employer that
would be bankrupted by hiring women).
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1, above, depicts two policies that equally increase a firm's profitability. Policy
A increases the firm's profit, by the increment AA, from a sub-competitive
position to the competitive level of zero economic profits. This includes a
reasonable return on capital; a firm earning zero economic profits covers its
overhead and is able to pay a reasonable, risk-adjusted dividend to its
shareholders. Policy B increases the firm's profitability by the same amount, by
the increment AB, but from the competitive level to a supra-competitive
level.12 The thesis of this Article is that increases in profits that stem from
market failure and rise to supra-competitive levels, such as caused by policy B,
should not provide a business justification for policies that have disparate
impacts on protected groups.
Admittedly, the above test is one-sided: it definitively adjudicates that
anti-competitive policies are unjustified, but it does not answer whether, or to
what extent, pro-competitive policies are justified. With regard to pro-
competitive policies, like policy A, courts will still need to consider the extent
to which firms might need to sacrifice profits to mitigate the adverse impacts of
their policies. They will need to decide the extent to which the law will impose
what Mark Kelman refers to as an "accommodation requirement."' 3 This
Article does not resolve this important and longstanding accommodation issue.
Defendant policies that are pro-competitive might nevertheless be unjustified if
one reads the statute as requiring businesses to sacrifice a reasonable amount of
profit to promote participation by protected class members.
However, this Article's largest contribution is in noticing that not all
increments to profitability deserve equal judicial respect. When a policy is anti-
competitive, larger increments to profitability make it less justifiable. A
purpose of extracting supra-competitive profits should not justify policies that
disproportionately hurt protected workers. While it strikes many that "profits
are profits" and any policy that enhances them is consistent with first principles
of a free market, the burden of this Article is to show that not all increments to
profitability should be given equal respect at the bar. In a sense, the Article
calls for civil rights to be more informed by an antitrust sensibility. Viewed
through an antitrust lens, supra-competitive profits presumptively reduce social
welfare and are suspect.
To see this intuition in the disparate impact context, consider the
following example: An employer pays high-school graduates an amount equal
to their marginal productivity but institutes a new policy of paying non-high-
12. The reasonable return on capital should be "risk-adjusted" because investors
reasonably expect a higher return on more risky investments. The reasonable risk-adjusted return
on particular company assets can be derived from beta regressions using the Capital Asset Pricing
Model. RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, (SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT 107-35 (1993).
13. Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 850
(2001).
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school graduates less. Imagine that the policy has a disparate impact against
African Americans, who, in this hypothetical, are less likely to have a high
school diploma. 14 The employer might justify the pay difference by arguing
that non-graduates tend be less productive than high-school graduates. I will
call this the productivity defense. 15 In the alternative, the employer might try to
justify paying non-graduates less, not because the non-graduates are less
productive, but solely because these employees have fewer employment
alternatives than high-school graduates. For example, imagine that non-
graduates were more tied to their hometown than graduates and hence had
fewer work alternatives. I will call this the market power defense, because the
lower pay is a function of the employer's greater market power over the non-
graduates.
Note that both of these defenses are, at core, about profitability. The
productivity defense in essence says that the policy enhances the firm's
profitability because the employer will be more profitable if it is not forced to
pay workers more than their marginal productivity. 16 A firm that pays less
productive workers the same as more productive workers will tend to be
unprofitable. But the market power defense is also about profitability, because
finding a group of workers who will work for a sub-competitive wage is also an
effective way for a firm to increase its profits.
My primary thesis is that courts should reject the market power defense
when it is used to extract supra-competitive profits. Anti-competitive conduct
should not justify policies that would otherwise violate civil rights law because
they produce racially disparate outcomes. More generally, anti-competitive
policies should not be recognized as a defense in a disparate impact case.
Indeed, anti-competitive policies that more radically increase an employer's
profits become ceteris paribus less justifiable. An employer who is able to more
profoundly take advantage of non-graduates by paying them a starvation wage
should not be able to point to the enormous profitability of the policy as a
mitigating factor in a disparate impact suit. 17 The above example depicts a kind
14. The hypothetical is, of course, inspired by Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431-32 (1971), where the employer had a policy of only hiring and promoting high-school
graduates. But our civil rights laws currently may not allow disparate impact suits with regard to
equal pay act violations. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71 (1981).
15. Alternatively, the employer might justify the lower pay by showing that non-graduates
impose higher (training) costs on the employer. But this would still be a defense about their net
productivity-net of training costs.
16. Remember in this hypothetical that the high-school graduates are being paid the
competitive wage (equal to their marginal productivity).
17. Forcing an employer to forego a policy that has a disparate racial impact in favor of a
less profitable policy becomes increasingly problematic when, in doing so, the employer is asked
to accept sub-competitive profitability. An employer is prima facie justified in trying to cover its
costs. In the foregoing example, trying to construct a wage policy where worker productivity does
not fall short of an employer's wage bill is accordingly a reasonable concern. But forcing an
employer to forego an anti-competitive policy in favor of a less profitable, but more pro-
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of wage-gouging--a policy of systematically paying non-graduates less than
their marginal product. 18 Wage-gouging should not be a business justification
for employment policies that disproportionately burden women or minorities.
Although civil rights law has historically been understood to be at odds
with a free market,19 in the wage-gouging context, disparate impact law can
complement antitrust and consumer protection law to make markets more
competitive and more equitable. Civil rights law can stimulate market
competition20 by raising the cost of anti-competitive conduct, such as wage-
gouging market niches that are disproportionately minority, and thus increase
the relative attractiveness of competitive behavior. 21
The combination of antitrust and consumer law concepts with
employment discrimination law is not a mere marriage of convenience; racial
disparity and market failure often go hand in hand.2 In the consumer context,
"the poor pay more" not just because of higher costs of supply but often
because sellers prey on consumers' limited access to information and
competitive alternatives. 13 Although, the first principles of economic theory
competitive policy is not problematic-even if the employer is asked to forego a substantial,
supra-competitive profit. This is the standard demand of both antitrust law and the common law of
unconscionability.
18. Wage-gouging is analogous to price-gouging. A firm that wage-gouges eams a supra-
competitive profit by paying workers less than they would earn if wage competition raised the
wage to equal the worker's marginal product.
19. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUND: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) (arguing that antidiscrimination law is antithetical to
freedom of contract and that the problems to which it is addressed are not the types of
coordination problems or externalities that typically justify state intervention). See also Richard
Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513 (1986) ("Social
welfare legislation, notably including legislation designed to help minority groups, is usually
thought to involve a trade-off between equity and efficiency, or between the just distribution of
society's wealth and the aggregate amount of that wealth.").
20. Daria Roithmayr is one of the few scholars to analyze how antitrust laws might be
used to attack the problem of civil rights. See Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-
in Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727 (2000). See also Ruby Z. Afram, Comment, Civil
Rights, Antitrust, and Early Decision Programs, 115 YALE L.J. 880 (2006) (arguing that college
early admission programs raise both antitrust and disparate impact concerns); Edward B. Rock,
Antitrust and the Market for Corporate Control, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1365 (1989) (showing how
antitrust analysis could be used to improve markets for corporate control). Dana L. Kaersvang has
recently shown how disparate impact can be used to make basic housing more accessible. The
Fair Housing Act and Disparate Impact in Homeowners Insurance, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1993
(2006).
21. The potential pro-competitive impact of civil rights law was first seen by John
Donohue. See generally John J. Donohue, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986).
Donohue saw that imposing extra costs on employers with discriminatory tastes could hasten their
exit from the market and thus dynamically improve market efficiency.
22. Gary Becker long ago emphasized that certain racial disparities were more likely to
persist in the absence of competition. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 46-
52, 159 (2d ed. 1971).
23. See DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE: CONSUMER PRACTICES OF Low-
INCOME FAMILIES 19-20 (1967).
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might suggest that their disproportionate poverty would tend to protect
minorities from the most rapacious excess of capitalism, study after study has
shown-in car negotiations, predatory lending, rent-to-own markets, and
dozens of other contexts-that sellers are able to extract disproportionate
profits from poor and disproportionately minority consumers. 24 Refusing a
defense to anti-competitive employment policies is a simple way to make
progress on two fronts that are inextricably linked.
Disparate impact analysis has been conceived as a cause of action that
allows the plaintiffs to act against instances of disparate treatment that would
otherwise fly below the law's radar. But this Article argues that disparate
impact analysis can also be used to allow plaintiffs to act against instances of
advantage-taking conduct that would otherwise fly below the radar of antitrust,
25unconscionability or consumer/worker protection law. The exploitations of
market power discussed here might not be actionable in and of themselves. But
when they give rise to otherwise actionable disparate impacts, it is appropriate
for them to be enjoined.
The remainder of this Article is divided into three parts. Part I elaborates
on the relationship between market competition and policies that produce
disparate impacts. It shows why limiting the business justification defense to
pro-competitive policies promotes both equity and efficiency. Part II argues
that this legal limitation is consistent with both "business necessity" and "job
related" conceptions of the defense. Part III then demonstrates how the theory
has been applied in analogous non-employment settings where anti-competitive
motives may create unjustified disparate racial impacts. The discussion in this
last Part will draw upon my experience as an expert witness in litigation against
the nation's major automobile lenders, in which I promoted the idea that price-
gouging is not a business justification. The Article will present not only my
views, but also the responses of three prominent experts for the defendants-
24. See IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND
GENDER DISCRIMINATION 19-44 (2001); JOHN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST:
THE CONTINUING COST OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 89-103 (1995); lan Ayres, Further
Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of its Cause, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 109 (1995); Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender in New Car Bargaining, 85 AM.
ECON. REV. 304 (1995); Kathryn Graddy, Do Fast-Food Chains Price Discriminate on the Race
and Income Characteristics of an Area?, 15 J. Bus. & ECON. STAT. 391 (1997); Howell E.
Jackson & Jeremy Berry, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread Premiums, 9
(2002), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/pdfs/january_draft.pdf, Jane
Kolodinsky, et al., Time Price Differentials in the Rent-to-own Industry: Implications for
Empowering Vulnerable Consumers, 29 INT'L J. CONSUMER STUD. 119 (2005); John Yinger,
Evidence on Discrimination in Consumer Markets, 12 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 23
(describing evidence of discrimination in several different consumer markets).
25. It is striking, however, that the sales practices found below with regard to car loans,
see infra Part III, would almost certainly be deemed independently illegal if the underlying
financial assets being traded were characterized as "securities" rather than loans and thus subject
to the full panoply of (a) the know-your-customer rules; (b) the NASD/NYSE mark-up rules; and
(c) the anti-fraud rules (i.e. the SEC's Rule 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005)).
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Richard Epstein, Nobel Prize-winning economist James Heckman, and George
Priest.
I
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARKET COMPETITION AND RACIAL DISPARITY
An economic analysis of market competition supports the argument that
pro- and anti-competitive policies should be legally distinguishable in disparate
impact analysis. In competitive markets, sellers are driven to pay workers their
marginal product and price products at their marginal cost. Market competition
accordingly puts pressure on a firm to pay non-graduates less if this group of
employees tends to have lower productivity. If there really is a productivity
difference between different types of workers, then a firm that pays non-
graduates and graduates the same will be at a competitive cost disadvantage
relative to competitor firms that pay non-graduates less. Therefore, employers
in competitive markets cannot (absent legal intervention) ignore differences in
marginal productivity in determining salaries and wage distinctions that are
byproducts of market competition. Market competition, however, does not put
pressure on a firm to gouge wages (pay a group of workers substantially less
than their marginal productivity) or to gouge prices (charge a group of
consumers substantially more than the product's marginal cost).
In the employment context, the core competitive distinction is between
policies motivated by an attempt to compensate workers at or above their
marginal productivity and those motivated by market power. Competition tends
to drive out the latter type of pricing distinctions. Rival employers in a
competitive market will tend to bid up sub-competitive wages. They will drive
all wages toward employees' marginal productivity. But competition will tend
to reinforce pricing distinctions based on marginal productivity.26 Market
competition reinforces the tendency of firms to adopt productivity-based wage
policies and undermines the tendency of firms to adopt market-power-based
wage policies. Thus, pricing distinctions that are a byproduct of market
competition provide a stronger business justification than pricing distinctions
that are the byproduct of market failure and only persist in the absence of
competition.
A. A Competitive Conduct Standard
A standard of perfect competition can be used as a benchmark to
distinguish policies that are potentially justified from those that are not. The
core idea is to imagine the policies that a decision-maker would adopt if forced
to compete with a large number of rival decision-makers. Hypothetical perfect
26. Severin Borenstein, Price Discrimination in Free-Entry Markets, 16 RAND J. ECON.
380 (1985).
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competition drives out policies based on exploitation of a decision-maker's
market power, but drives in (or reinforces) policies that are based on real
differences in cost or productivity. Woe be it to a firm that ignores real
differences in cost or productivity. And woe be it to a firm in competition that
tries to pay a sub-competitive wage or charge a supra-competitive price.
The discussion of competition up to this point may strike many readers as
odd. The free-wheeling market forces that bring buyers and sellers together in
marketplace negotiations seem like competition in its purest form. From this
perspective, all this talk about supra-competitive pricing seems to be a
misnomer because, under this conception, there can be no such thing as a
supra-competitive price. The competitive price or the competitive wage is
whatever the market can bear.
The problem here is that there are competing ideas of what "competition"
means. In one sense, competition is the struggle between an employer and a
worker (or a buyer and a seller) to determine how they will split the potential
gains from trade between them. But economic analysis and the law itself have
long ago rejected this form of competition as a normative benchmark.
Monopolists have never been able to protect themselves by arguing that they
were only charging what the market could bear or that consumers had
consented to pay the contract price.
It initially seems plausible to argue that employers are justified in
maximizing their profits by paying whatever wage the market will bear. This
argument (again, putting aside the important issue of accommodation) makes
sense when the market is sufficiently competitive. Competition disciplines
employers to set wages so as to at least equal the employee's marginal product.
But when there is a market failure, either because of a lack of alternative
employment opportunities or because employees are imperfectly informed
about alternative opportunities, the wage paid may bear no relation to the
worker's expected productivity. When the market fails, the wage that
employers can pay will not be the amount that the market can bear, but instead
will be determined by what the individual consumer can bear.
Civil rights law should follow the standard antitrust approach and focus
on the degree of competition among multiple sellers. An analysis of how
multiple employers would compete for the services of individual employees
can produce a competitive conduct benchmark for both wage and non-wage
27policies against which one could judge real-world decisions. This benchmark
is normatively attractive as promoting not only efficiency but also multiple
27. Traditionally, the antitrust inquiry has been firm-centric instead of consumer- or
worker-centric. While it would be theoretically comprehensible to analyze how multiple workers
might behave in competing for an individual job, or how multiple consumers would behave in
competing for an individual product, the standard normative lens to judge the behavior of firms
(qua both sellers and employers) is to ask how multiple firms would compete for the services of
employees or the patronage of customers.
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dimensions of equity. Competition tends to transfer the gains of trade from
producers to consumers and workers and tends to reduce inequalities that are
not based on productivity or cost of production.2 8
An analysis of competition (and its absence) also explains how anti-
competitive policies can have disparate racial impacts. The next two
subsections will show that: (1) both wage and price discrimination (paying
different wages or charging different prices to different groups) and supra-
competitive pricing (paying a sub-competitive wage or charging a single,
supra-competitive price) can produce civil rights disparities; and, (2) enjoining
these practices can simultaneously promote efficiency and equity. To make
clear the connection with standard antitrust analysis, the focus here will mostly
be on anti-competitive conduct regarding product-pricing decisions. But
Section III will show how the same anti-competitive motives can give rise to
more traditional disparate impact suits concerning hiring, firing, promotion, and
terms and conditions of employment.
B. Disparate Racial Impacts of Price Discrimination
The term "discrimination" is not just a creature of civil rights law.
Antitrust law and economics has long understood that firms with market power
may have incentives to price discriminate as a means of making supra-
competitive profits. Price discrimination is at play whenever a firm makes
systematically different rates of profit from different groups of consumers for
similar products or different groups of employees for similar work. For
example, an airline with market power on a particular route may charge
business travelers higher fares than tourists, not because business travelers
impose higher costs on the airline, but because business travelers have a less
elastic demand for air travel and hence are willing to pay more. Policies that
implement price discrimination can directly cause disparate impacts if minority
racial groups are disproportionately represented in the groups from which the
firm is extracting high profits. Employers can price discriminate in the wages
they pay by, for example, paying non-graduates less than graduates, not
because the former are less productive, but because non-graduates have a less
elastic supply curve and hence are willing to work for less.
Some scholars, like Judge Posner, would only invalidate policies that
"gratuitously" or "needlessly" burden minorities-in the sense that alternative
policies could have been employed that were equally profitable. 29 This
standard suggests a very narrow ground for liability, because profit-maximizing
firms tend to seek out the policies that are the most profitable. The "gratuitous
standard" would only tend to smoke out instances of covert animus, where a
firm was willing to accept lower profits to further a discriminatory motive. But
28. Kelman, supra note 13, at 850.
29. Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 583 (quoting Finnegan, 967 F.2d at 1164).
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a broader appreciation of price discrimination suggests that a profit motive can
be unjustified if the profits result from exploiting a failure of market
competition. Non-gratuitous, profit-maximizing policies can disproportionately
hurt minorities, even when motivated only by a decision-maker's desire to
exploit its market power.
Why are policies that induce supra-competitive profits less justified? The
next section will provide a doctrinal legal answer. The policy reason is that
price discrimination is inimical to well-accepted notions of both equity and
efficiency. The equitable case against price discrimination is straightforward.
The idea of extracting different rates of profit from different classes of
consumers or employees, not because of the costs they impose but because of
differences in their need, is inconsistent with basic notions of equality and fair
play. In fact, the same equal protection norm undergirds the social concem with
both civil rights and antitrust discrimination. The argument that discriminating
polices are inefficient, however, requires more elaboration. As an initial matter,
the competition standard for adjudicating business justification is also
supported by a straightforward analysis of allocative efficiency. 30 Competitive
pricing (including competitive wage setting) promotes economic efficiency-as
goods and services tend to flow toward their highest use. 3 1 When prices are
based on cost, consumers will only buy when they value the good or service
more than its cost of production. A competition standard for "business
justification" would accordingly tend to validate cost-based pricing of products
and productivity-based wages for labor, even if these policies induced disparate
racial impacts.
In contrast, supra-competitive pricing (and sub-competitive wages) can
retard economic efficiency. Supra-competitive prices can create what
economists call dead-weight losses in efficiency, where consumers who value
the product more than its cost are nonetheless deterred from buying because of
its inflated price.
32
As depicted in Figure 2, a non-discriminating monopolist that charges a
single price to all consumers causes a group of marginal consumers to stop
purchasing (the striped area 3). The inefficiency of supra-competitive pricing
comes from the dead-weight loss of people who value the good more than its
cost but are nonetheless deterred by supra-competitive pricing from purchasing.
A competitive standard for business justification would accordingly tend to
30. Allocative efficiency ensures that goods and services end up in the hands of (in other
words, are allocated to) the people who value them the most highly. See generally IAN AYRES,
OPTIONAL LAW (2005) (analyzing the impact of law on allocative efficiency).
31. Id.
32. For more on dead-weight losses, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market
Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 954, app. (1981) (defining dead-weight loss as
"loss of consumer and producer surplus when output declines from the competitive to the
monopoly level; it is the most common measure of the social costs of monopoly").
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exclude this kind of single-price, supra-competitive price setting.33







But the impact of price discrimination on allocative efficiency is more
complicated. Certain types of price discrimination have the potential for
reducing the allocative inefficiency of supra-competitive pricing. 34 Price
discrimination holds the potential of reducing the dead-weight loss depicted in
Figure 2 by allowing the seller with market power to set different prices for
different types of consumers. In theory, if a monopolist could perfectly price
discriminate--charging each consumer their actual value for the product-there
would be no inefficiency from price discrimination, as the monopolist would
sell the efficient amount by lowering the price just enough to attract each
consumer. 
35
33. The next section will show this tendency more explicitly. See infra Section I.C.
34. See generally RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (2d
ed. 2001).
35. Even if price discrimination were a net improvement in allocative efficiency relative
to an inflated single-price (or a deflated single-wage) equilibrium, it still might not constitute a
business justification under the competition standard. Less than perfect price discrimination would
still not represent an enhancement in allocative efficiency relative to a competitive single-price
equilibrium. As in antitrust, the crucial question is whether the competitive or the non-
discriminatory (but possible supra-competitive) is used as the allocative benchmark. At a
minimum, any price-discrimination that does not increase the quantity of goods sold (relative to
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However, in practice, perfect price discrimination (also called first-degree
price discrimination) is not feasible. Sellers with market power do not know
how much individual consumers are willing to pay. Sellers who try to use more
extreme forms of price discrimination may find that consumers who are offered
lower prices resell the goods to consumers who are offered higher prices.
Normally, the best that sellers can implement is what economists call second-
36
or third-degree price discrimination. The sellers place different types of
consumers in different groups and charge the groups different prices. Unlike
first-degree price discrimination, second- and third-degree price discrimination
is less efficient than the competitive equilibrium, and may even be less efficient
than allowing a seller with market power to set a single, anti-competitive price
for all consumers. In equilibrium with second- or third-degree price differences,
the low-price group experiences less dead-weight loss compared to the single-
price model, but the high-price group experiences greater dead-weight loss, and
this latter effect may dominate to create a net loss in efficiency.
37
Because of both the efficiency and equity concerns with price
discrimination, it is not surprising that there has been a fair amount of legal
hostility to this practice-for example, in the Robinson-Patman Act's
prohibition of price discrimination. 38 But Robinson-Patman's coverage is
incomplete because it only protects wholesale consumers, not retail
consumers. 39 Hence many forms of discriminatory pricing can fly under the
radar of our antitrust statutes.
A competition standard would find that second-degree and third-degree
price discrimination policies aimed at raising profits above the competitive
level do not constitute a valid business justification. The competition standard
would not render price discrimination per se illegal; it would only mean that
price and wage discrimination policies that disparately burdened racial
minorities and other protected classes would not be saved because they
36. With second-degree price discrimination, the seller gives quantity discounts or
charges different prices for versions of the same product with different qualities. With third-
degree price discrimination the seller separates consumers into different groups (for example, by
age or geography) and charges different prices to each group. See DOUGLAS A. RUBY, PRICE
DISCRIMINATION (2003), http://www.digitaleconomist.com/pd_4010.html.
37. Moreover, the price discrimination tends to be inefficient in a more dynamic sense
because it gives firms a bigger incentive to invest in creating market power. Prohibitions of price
discrimination, by reducing the incentive to invest in barriers to entry and the like, may produce
more competitive equilibria. See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and
Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807, 822 (1975) (additional profit created by price discrimination
creates social costs, because it gives monopolists increased incentives to undertake socially
wasteful investments to create or maintain market power).
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimination on
goods sold to equally situated distributors where the effect of the discrimination is substantially to
lessen or eliminate competition.
39. Id.
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successfully extracted supra-competitive profits.4 °
C. Disparate Racial Impacts Caused by Simple Monopoly Overcharges
Price discrimination is not the only anti-competitive policy that can
produce disparate racial impacts. Just charging a supra-competitive price (or a
sub-competitive wage) can disparately burden minorities. Returning again to
Figure 2, we see that monopoly pricing can harm consumers in two different
ways. First, it hurts high-value consumers who pay the supra-competitive
price--effectively extracting some of the consumer surplus that high value
consumers would have received under competition and transferring it via the
higher price to the seller. Second, it hurts low-value consumers who refuse to
pay the supra-competitive price, but would have purchased at the competitive
price. If minorities are disproportionately represented in either of these groups,
supra-competitive pricing could cause a disparate racial impact.
For example, if minority consumers have a lower ability to pay and
consequently tend to be over-represented in the lower right portion of the
demand curve, then supra-competitive pricing will disproportionately exclude
minority consumers from the market (relative to what their participation would
have been at a competitive price). Alternatively, minorities may be over-
represented in the purchasing group that knuckles under and pays the supra-
competitive overcharge. This might happen, for example, at an inner-city
grocery store, where a minority consumer might have less access to
transportation to alternative stores and is consequently more likely to use the
local grocery. Again, notice the difference between pro- and anti-competitive
behavior: an inner-city store might charge higher prices either because it has
higher costs or because it has more market power over its customers. Both
policies would enhance the store's profitability, but only the first would be
consistent with a competitive standard.
The possibility that minorities could be burdened by either being
disproportionately excluded by a monopoly overcharge or bearing the
overcharge itself creates a kind of Catch-22 for the monopolist. Unless
40. A competition standard should also take into account the requirement that businesses
cover their fixed costs. For example, price discrimination might be justified by the attempt of
sellers to cover their legitimate fixed costs by charging higher prices to a class of consumers who
have less elastic demand. But the discussion of automobile dealerships in Part III illustrates that
some of the fixed costs may be the costs of implementing a price-discrimination system and would
not be justified. See infra Part Ill. A natural standard for assessing whether fixed costs justify a
particular policy is to ask whether enjoining the policy would lead to a reduction in industry
output. As applied to automotive lending, the evidence suggests that two states, Arkansas and
Ohio, that severely limited price-gouging did not experience a disruption in consumers' ability to
finance cars. See infra Part III; Ian Ayres, Expert Report, Willis et al. v. American Honda Finance
Corp. No. 3-02-0490, at 34 (M.D. Tenn. Jun. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Ayres, Honda Report]. This
suggests at least that lending markups detailed below were not justified by lenders' or dealerships'
need to cover fixed costs.
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minorities are equally represented in the purchasing and non-purchasing
groups, it will always be the case that under-representation in one group will
mean over-representation in the other. For example, imagine that minorities
would have made up 25% of customers if a competitive price had been
charged. Then a showing that minorities are underrepresented (<25%) in the
purchasing group perforce means that minorities must be overrepresented in the
non-purchasing group. The opposite scenario is, of course, also possible. This
possible liability for multiple dimensions of disparity raises important
Connecticut v. Teal issues.
4 1
Moreover, minorities and women are not the only potential plaintiffs who
could bring a disparate impact challenge. Non-minorities who are
disproportionately burdened might be able to challenge the supra-competitive
42policy as well. In theory, it would only be a truly pathological case where an
anti-competitive policy would not burden any protected group or its
complement.
But this problem of multiple disparate impact plaintiffs with multiple
disparate impact claims is present with regard to any business justification
standard-not just the competition standard. A test that does not have a
disparate impact against minorities will by definition have a disparate against
non-minorities, unless equal percentages of minorities and non-minorities make
up each group. Any business practice that does not pass a business justification
test (whatever that test is) is likely to be subject to challenge, because in all
likelihood, some protected class of workers or consumers would be
disproportionately burdened by the practice. But in the real world, courts rarely
hold businesses liable for practices that disproportionately burden whites.43
41. Connecticut v. Teal said that individual questions on a test can give rise to disparate
impact liability even if the overall results on the test did not produce a disparate impact. 457 U.S.
440, 452 (1982) (rejecting the "bottom line" defense; that is, a disparate impact in any one stage in
the hiring process will still give rise to a prima facie employment discrimination claim even if the
employer's resulting hiring profile exhibits no disparate impact in the end); see also Ayres &
Siegelman, supra note 6, at 1489-91 (arguing that disparate impact liability might actually induce
employers to discriminate against minorities in hiring because disparate impact liability can also
attach to employers' firing decisions). At least as an analytic matter it would be possible to
aggregate the various types of harm to assess whether the monopoly overcharge
disproportionately hurt minorities. In economic terms, both the purchasing and non-purchasing
consumers are forced to sacrifice some of their consumer surplus and it would be possible to
assess whether minority consumers sacrificed a disproportionate amount of the consumer surplus
they would have enjoyed if a more competitive price had been offered. (Even more expansively,
one might consider the potentially offsetting incidence of such impacts on minority shareholders
or employees). But the burdens of exclusion from employment and consumption markets could
create distinct burdens on minority communities that might justify the more disaggregated
analysis of impacts on the non-purchasing and purchasing groups.
42. See Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims
by White Males, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1505, 1512 (2004).
43. See id. at 1524-26; see also Woods v. Perry, 375 F.3d 671, 673 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting
that in reverse discrimination claims, plaintiffs must also demonstrate background circumstances
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Thus, a competition standard is unlikely to render all anti-competitive practices
subject to successful challenge under the disparate impact laws. Regardless of
whether courts overrule Teal (and allow a bottom line defense) or otherwise
reign in the multiple plaintiffs problem, 44 the argument of this Article is simply
that an otherwise objectionable practice (i.e. a prima facie disparate impact) is
not rendered less objectionable by a showing that the practice was instituted to
exploit the defendant's market power.
In sum, this section has shown how the competitive standard furthers both
equity and efficiency. But stepping back, we can now see that this standard is
an attempt to make civil rights law continuous with and complementary to
other laws of advantage-taking-including the law of antitrust (which attempts
to discourage supra-competitive pricing) and the law of consumer protection
(which attempts to discourage unconscionable pricing). While this attempt
might at first seem strained, it is not, because market failure and racial disparity
often appear hand in hand. Minorities are disproportionately the victims of anti-
competitive and unconscionable practices. It is therefore natural to build
bridges across these areas of law.45
H
THE COMPETITION STANDARD COMPORTS WITH EXISTING PRECEDENT
This competition standard also comports with a careful reading of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 and its judicial interpretations. The Act requires an
employer "to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job-related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity. 46 The simplest and
strongest reason to reject a business necessity defense for anti-competitive
practices is that firms are not forced to act anti-competitively to survive
financially; it is not consistent with business necessity to wage- or price-gouge.
Competition may force firms to pay employees wages commensurate with their
productivity (or to charge prices commensurate with their costs), but
establishing that the defendant is "that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority");
Mattioda v. White, 323 F.3d 1288, 1293 (10th Cir. 2003) (same); Russell v. Principi, 251 F.3d
815, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (same).
44. I have argued that Teal should be repealed, because it perversely punishes firms for
success in hiring minorities. Specifically, Teal holds liable firms that fire minorities at
disproportionately high rates even when the firm's minority employee share remains greater than
the minority share of the qualified applicant pool after the firing. See Ayres & Siegelman, supra
note 6, at 1517; see also Cynthia Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an A t-Will World,
74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1679-82 (1996).
45. Harmonization is a two-way street. The analysis also suggests that antitrust and
consumer protection enforcement can be mobilized to make markets less discriminatory. Indeed,
enforcement authorities in these related areas might do well to look for market processes that
produce racial disparities as a guide to consumer-oriented intervention more generally. And civil
rights authorities might do well to look for places of market failure as a likely indicator of
discrimination.
46. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(A)(ii) (1991).
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competition does not force an employer to exploit its market power.
A. The "Job Related" Standard
Opponents of disparate impact liability tend to focus on the "job related"
language instead of the "business necessity" language of the defense.47 But it
turns out that even if the "consistent with business necessity" requirement were
somehow read out of the statute, the "job related" requirement would by itself
exclude as a defense the exploitation of market power. The statute does not
speak in terms of "business related" or "profitability related" justifications. It
instead restricts the defense to policies that are "job related for the position in
question"-that is, related to employees' ability to do the particular job.48
Hence, the phrase "job related" can be used to restrict analysis to policies that
screen for differences in employee productivity on the job. The phrase would
exclude market power differences, which often relate to an employee's
opportunities to perform other jobs rather than the employee's ability to
perform the job at hand.
Returning to our original example, an employer who pays non-graduates
less, not because they are less productive, but only because they have fewer
employment alternatives, should fail in an attempt "to demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job-related for the position in question." Far from being
related to the job in question, the practice of paying lower wages is instead
related to the absence of other job opportunities.
This reading of the statute also resonates with the Supreme Court's first
attempt to grapple with the contours of the defense. In Griggs, the Supreme
Court repeatedly emphasized that to qualify as a defense the practice had to be
related to job performance:
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that
are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is
business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to
exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the
practice is prohibited.49
And:
47. See Teal, 457 U.S. at 446-47 (1982) (noting that the employer must demonstrate job-
relatedness); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 408, 425 (1975) (reaffirming that the
burden of proving job-relatedness is the employer's and discussing the question of "what must an
employer show to establish that pre-employment tests racially discriminatory in effect, though not
in intent, are sufficiently 'job-related' to survive challenge under Title VII"); Pamela L. Perry,
Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 582-83 (1991). In
doing so, such opponents ignore the use of the phrase "business necessity" in three parts of the
statute. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (West 2006); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(B)(ii)
(West 2006); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(2) (West 2006).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(A)(ii) (1991).
49. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. See also id. at 426 (stating that the practice must be
"significantly related to successful job performance").
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[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability.
50
An employment practice that exploits an employer's market power is not
related to job performance or to measuring job capability. The court concluded
that the high school diploma requirement at issue in the case was not "shown to
bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for
which it was used.",5' It is fairly clear under Griggs that a policy of refusing to
promote workers to higher-paying jobs would be unjustified if it was
motivated, not by the workers' ability to perform the job in question, but
simply as a way to exploit the employer's market power over un-promoted
workers. Even if profitable, the practice would be unjustified because Griggs
limited the defense to practices that were related to job performance.
We see a similar analysis in Dothard v. Rawlinson. In reviewing a
minimum weight requirement shown to have a disparate impact against women
applicants, the Supreme Court held that, to establish a business justification, the
defendant must show that the criterion was "necessary to safe and efficient job
performance. 5 3 Indeed, this emphasis on job performance is central to the
established tripartite methods of validating employment tests. Under the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines, there are three techniques
of validation: criterion, content, and construct validation. 54 Criterion validation
requires the employer to establish a statistically significant correlation between
successful performance on a selection device and successful performance of the
job.55 Content validation requires the employer to establish that the selection
device directly measures important job-related behaviors (such as a typing test
for a typist).56 Construct validation requires the employer to establish that the
test measures the more abstract characteristic it claims to measure, and that this
characteristic is important to successful performance on the job.57 The
touchstone of all validation is relating the selection criterion to the ability to
perform the job in question. It is easy to imagine a test that elicited information
not about an applicant's ability to perform the job but instead about the
50. Id. at 432.
51. Id. at 431. See also id. at 432 (practice must have "a manifest relationship to the
employment in question").
52. See 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977).
53. Id. at331 n.14.
54. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 352 F. Supp. 187, 191 (1972) ("The [EEOC]
guidelines recognize the fact that basically there are three methods of validating the job-
relatedness of a given test: criterion, content, and construct.").
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applicant's bargaining power. 58 But a test which succeeded in identifying
applicants with low market power--even if it dramatically increased the
employer's profits-could not meet the demands of criterion, content, or
construct validation because it is not related to the ability of applicants to
perform the job in question.
B. The "Legitimate Business Objective" Standard
In struggling to define the contours of the business justification defense,
courts have not spoken with a single voice, however. While the Supreme
Court's early disparate impact cases tied the defense to job performance, New
York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, in its brief analysis of business necessity,
shifted the emphasis toward whether the practice furthered the employer's
"legitimate employment goals." 59 As Linda Lye has observed: "With a deft
sleight of pen, the Beazer Court shifted the focus away from the narrow
requirement of job performance to the more amorphous category of
employment goals."
60
The embrace of legitimate business objectives as an alternative to job
performance could also be seen in lower court opinions. For example, in
Christensen v. Iowa, 61 a class of female employees at a state university brought
a disparate impact action challenging the university's practice of paying less for
clerical work than it did for maintenance work of "comparable value to the
employer." 62 The Eight Circuit summarily rejected the plaintiffs' claim:
[Plaintiffs'] theory ignores economic realities. The value of the job to
the employer represents but one factor affecting wages. Other factors
may include the supply of workers willing to do the job and the ability
of the workers to band together to bargain collectively for higher
wages. We find nothing in the text and history of Title VII suggesting
that Congress intended to abrogate the laws of supply and demand or
other economic principles that determine wage rates for various kinds
of work. We do not interpret Title VII as requiring an employer to
58. For example, an employment application might ask employees about their ties to the
community, willingness to move or even their amount of indebtedness. The Graduate and
Professional School Financial Aid Service Form that many students fill out can be seen as just
such a "test." The University says, "You tell us (under penalty of pejury) how much you can pay,
and then we'll tell you how much (net of scholarship) we'll charge you to attend." See Aaron
Edlin & Ian Ayres, Why Legislating Low Tuitions for State Colleges is a Mistake, Findlaw's Legal
Commentary, Oct. 30, 2003, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20031030_ayres.html.
59. 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979).
60. Lye, supra note 3, at 328.
61. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977); see infra note 73.
62. 563 F.2d at 354. See also Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A
"Quota Bill, " a Codification of Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 287, 348-62 (1993) (discussing the application of business necessity under
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, including whether an employer is limited to performance-based
justifications).
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ignore the market in setting wage rates for genuinely different work
classifications. 63
I will return to this case when we discuss the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Smith v. City of Jackson.64 Now, it suffices to say that the decision cannot be
read as merely judging whether the university's pay practice was geared to job
performance; instead, it embraced as legitimate the objective of matching
market-generated wages.
This shift from a "job performance" to a "legitimate business objective"
requirement also played out in the struggle to pass what ultimately became the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. 65 Senator Edward M. Kennedy originally introduced
a bill that required that "the practice must bear a significant relationship to
successful performance of the job. 66 But the first Bush Administration
"insisted that it would only sign a bill that permitted employers to use selection
practices that served legitimate business objectives, even if
these objectives did not concern successful performance of the particular job in
question.
' 67
A fair reading of the post-1991 cases suggest that lower courts have
continued at times to ask whether an employer's practice furthers a legitimate
business goal, even if the goal is unrelated to the employee's job performance.
For example, in Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta,68 the Eleventh Circuit found that
a fire department's interest in worker safety was "an important business goal"
and that the department's "clean shaven" requirement was reasonably
necessary to achieve this goal. 69 A central contention in the litigation was that
63. 563 F.2d at 356; see also Am. Fed'n of Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d
1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985) ("We find nothing in the language of Title VII or its legislative history
to indicate Congress intended to abrogate fundamental economic principles such as the laws of
supply and demand or to prevent employers from competing in the labor market."); Lemons v.
City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229 (10th Cir. 1980).
64. See 544 U.S. 228, 242-43 (2005).
65. Pub. L. No. 102-166.
66. S. 3239, 101st Cong. (2d Sess. 1990).
67. See Spiropoulos, supra note 2, at 1510.
68. 2F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993).
69. See id. at 1119. The idea of non-job-related but legitimate business goal practices is
also discussed in Browne, supra note 62, at 348:
[H]iring procedures may be adopted for legitimate business reasons other than
prediction of future job performance. For example, in Wards Cove the employers had
entered into a hiring-hall agreement with a largely Filipino union local in Seattle. As
a result, the positions for which the union supplied employees were held
disproportionately by Filipinos. If a black person had challenged the employers' use
of a hiring hall on the ground that a disproportionately small number of blacks were
hired for cannery positions, the employers could not possibly defend on the basis of
"job performance," since that would require a showing that employees procured
through the hiring hall performed better than potential employees who were excluded
because of the hiring-hall agreement. However, the usual reason for an employer's
entering into a hiring-hall agreement is not that employees hired under such an
agreement will perform better than other employees. Rather, it is to maintain a
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oxygen masks might work better on clean-shaven firemen, meaning that
bearded employees may not be as effective at putting out fires. But even if we
take the emphasis on employee safety as a legitimate business objective that is
separate from the employee's ability to perform the job, we should see that this
objective is radically different from the objective of an employer to exploit its
market power over a worker. The first is an objective to protect the employee;
the second is an objective to profit by injuring the employee. So even a more
expansive reading of business goals would read wage-gouging, or the
exploitation of an employee's lack of market power, as illegitimate.
The most recent precedent about what might count as legitimate business
objectives is also the most troubling. In City of Jackson, the Supreme Court
rejected an age-based disparate impact claim against a city's plan for raising the
wage of its police officers. The policy caused "almost two-thirds (66.2%) of
the officers under 40 [to receive] raises of more than 10% while less than half
(45.3%) of those over 40 [received a raise].",71 Notwithstanding this disparity,
the Court found the city's plan justified:
Thus, the disparate impact is attributable to the City's decision to give
raises based on seniority and position. Reliance on seniority and rank
is unquestionably reasonable given the City's goal of raising
employees' salaries to match those in surrounding communities. In
sum, we hold that the City's decision to grant a larger raise to lower
echelon employees for the purpose of bringing salaries in line with that
of surrounding police forces was a decision based on a "reasonable
factor other than age" that responded to the City's legitimate goal of
retaining police officers.
72
Even though the Court was evaluating the plan in terms of the Age
Discrimination Act's specialized reasonable factor other than age ("RFOA")
affirmative defense, the Court's reasoning harkens back to the Eight Circuit's
analysis in Christensen: "We find nothing in the text and history of Title VII
suggesting that Congress intended to abrogate the laws of supply and demand
or other economic principles that determine wage rates for various kinds of
reliable source of labor.
70. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 228.
71. Id. at 423. This evidence about the percentage increase in wages may not be the most
accurate measure of impact. Because more senior workers earned a higher base wage, a smaller
average percentage increase might still represent a higher absolute dollar increase. But the Court
bizarrely ruled that the plaintiffs had "not identified any specific test, requirement, or practice
within the pay plan that has an adverse impact on older workers"-even though the very next
paragraph described in detail the operation of the city's algorithm of dividing the five basic police
officer positions into "a series of steps and half-steps." Id. at 422. As a result of the algorithm,
officers in the lowest steps that were disproportionately under 40 received larger percentage wage
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work., 7 3 But, like Christensen, the Supreme Court was wrong to say it is
unquestionably reasonable to raise "employees' salaries to match those in
surrounding communities."
74
The problem is that the Court has been focusing on the wrong half of the
equation. It is indeed reasonable for an employer to pay high wages to those
workers who are in high demand. Profit-maximizing firms have strong
incentives not to overpay employees. Accordingly, the willingness of other
firms to pay a high wage is strong evidence that the high market wage is
deserved. But the problem lies with regard to the low-wage employees. An
employer who merely matches the market salaries of low-wage employees may
merely be reflecting these employees' relative lack of market power. The
market wage for these employees may be low because they are more dependent
on a particular job, not because they are less productive.
Indeed, the foregoing example of wage-gouging might be hidden within
the City of Jackson record, which the Supreme Court found unproblematic as a
matter of law. 75 The police officers who garnered low raises under the system
geared to match salaries in other communities might end up with less simply
because this type of worker in community after community has low mobility
and thus has fewer employers vying for her labor. The wage setting of a
monopsonist, however, is not rendered more reasonable merely because
another monopsonist charges a similarly low wage.
In a sense, the Supreme Court's ruling in City of Jackson supports the
thesis of this Article because it seems to be relying on a competition test in
determining the reasonableness of an employer's wage-setting. 76 But relying on
a market test without credible evidence of actual competition for low-wage
employees can reify market failure. When there is not sufficient competition for
immobile workers, "meeting competition" becomes simply another phrase for
paying as little as the market will allow.
My analysis of wage setting in labor markets can of course be criticized as
overly stylized. In the real world, employers do not set the wage to exactly
equal the marginal product of each worker. Still, it is reasonable to assume that
profit-maximizing employers will be reluctant to pay workers more than their
marginal product. In a City of Jackson case, the employer might not be called
upon to show that the wages of all its employees were commensurate with their
marginal product, but an employer might be called upon to show that the
favored workers were in fact more productive than the disfavored workers. In
response to a showing of disparate impact, the employer should be asked to
produce some evidence that it was not merely exploiting its bargaining power.
73. 563 F.2d at 356.
74. 544 U.S. at 242.
75. Id. at 241.
76. Id. at 242.
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The possibility that wage setting can be driven by market power is not a
foreign concept to academics. For example, deans can exploit immobility by
paying less to professors who are immobile. In fact, the source of market power
is not limited to immobility, but may also include imperfect information or
aversion to bargaining. For instance, Linda Babcock and Sarah Laschever in
Women Don't Ask document the disproportionate impacts that can be visited
upon women workers who are reluctant to ask for a higher wage. 77 An
employer's decision to establish a negotiated wage-setting process might be
motivated by a simple desire to exploit the reluctance of certain employees to
ask for a higher wage. If addressed head on, I predict that courts would be
reluctant to accept the exploitation of worker bargaining weakness as a
legitimate business justification for paying equally productive workers less.
In sum, neither of the existing standards for consideration of a business
necessity defense support exploitation of market inequality by employers. The
job-related standard focuses on an employee's ability to perform the job in
question, and not his relative ability to perform other jobs in the market.
Though the interpretation of the legitimate business objective standard has been
less uniform, it also should be read to exclude a defense that relies on anti-
competitive market exploitation.
The competitive conduct standard has potential relevance in resolving
both hiring and promotion cases. Although it is obvious that employers cannot
exploit workers that they do not hire, the earlier discussion of dead-weight loss
showed that the motive to exploit market power against workers could
disproportionately harm minorities by inducing them not to contract. 78 Hence, a
policy that disproportionately harmed women or minorities by refusing to
contract with them might be actionable if the rationale for the policy was solely
to extract a supra-competitive return from other workers. Moreover, hiring
decisions might be challenged if they were conjoined with assignment to
different level jobs. In other words, a policy that tended to place workers with
lower bargaining power in low-paying jobs and workers with higher bargaining
power in higher-paying jobs would run afoul of the competition standard if the
workers were equally productive.
Promotion cases also provide fertile ground for application of the theory.
If an employer sets up a promotion system that fails to promote workers not
because they are less productive than promoted workers, but because they are
more willing to work at lower wages, promotion rules can have the same effect
as the wage story told above. Indeed, because promotions are routinely
accompanied by wage increases, a promotion system that is based on an
employer's relative market power can be an effective tool for implementing
77. LINDA BABCOCK & SARAH LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE
GENDER DIVIDE 41-61 (2002).
78. See supra Section l.B.
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wage-gouging over time. Our earlier discussion of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in City of Jackson shows just this possibility. 79 Finally, while this
section has focused on the applicability of the competition standard to disparate
impact law, it is worth noting how the analysis applies to two different
disparate treatment defenses. First, the foregoing theory should not limit
defendant's ability to rebut a plaintiffs prima facie case of disparate treatment
by proposing a nondiscriminatory rationale for an employment decision.80 An
employer who adopted a race-neutral policy is not acting pretextually if its real
motive is to increase profits by exploiting its power over weak employees. But
this Article's analysis should limit a defendant's bona fide occupational
qualification ("BFOQ") defense. 81 A defendant who admits to disparate
treatment but who wishes to establish that "religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise" 82 should not be able to argue
that the disparate treatment is justified by a need to exploit its market power.
Indeed, it is already the accepted judicial view that an employer cannot
establish a BFOQ defense merely by showing that disparate treatment increases
its profitability. 83
III
THE AUTOMOBILE LENDING LITIGATION
The foregoing sections put forward the economic and doctrinal arguments
for the simple idea that anti-competitive practices, even if profitable, should not
justify otherwise actionable disparate impacts in the employment context.
Much of the discussion has been animated by a hypothetical example of wage-
gouging, where an employer paid non-graduates less than graduates, not
because they were less productive, but merely because the non-graduates need
their jobs more. Because the Supreme Court has expressly limited the ability of
79. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
80. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1987) (holding that once a
defendant has offered a nondiscriminatory rationale for an employment decision, the burden of
proving the decision's invalidity remains with the plaintiff).
81. The BFOQ defense allows employers to consider "religion, sex, or national origin in
those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise." The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000). See, e.g., Healey v.
Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that the BFOQ defense
allowed a psychiatric hospital to consider gender as part of its employment policies without
illegally discriminating).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
83. Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 304 (N.D. Tex. 198 1) ("[The] necessity
test focuses on the company's ability 'to perform the primary function or service it offers,' not its
ability to compete .... [A] potential loss of profits or possible loss of competitive advantage
following a shift to non-discriminatory hiring does not establish business necessity .... ).
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plaintiffs to bring disparate impact claims based on the Equal Pay Act, 84
however, it is not in the wage-gouging realm that our real-world traction is to
be found for applying the theory. To date, the most important application of the
theory that exploitation of market power should not serve as a justification for
policies that have a disparate impact on protected classes can be found not in
the employment setting but in recent automobile lending litigation.
The competitive conduct test has played a central role in massive
disparate impact litigation that has been brought under the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act ("ECOA") in more than a dozen class action suits against all
of the major automotive lenders. While this litigation is important in itself for
curtailing some of the most egregious examples of interest-rate-gouging in auto
loans, it also affords me the opportunity to set the competitive conduct standard
on firmer ground by responding to a formidable set of critics hired to help
defend the industry's price-setting practices.
A. Undisclosed Dealership Markups in Automobile Lending
The emergence of clear evidence of supra-competitive, profit-enhancing
policies that disparately impacted African American borrowers in auto lending
provides a powerful setting to test intuitions about the need for a competition
standard in employment discrimination. The automobile finance industry is
large and provides a crucial service in facilitating people's access to
transportation. Mark Cohen reports that nearly 80% of all auto financing is
done on site at a dealer and that so-called "captive lenders" have anywhere
from 30-50% of this business with the remaining amount distributed over
various lenders, including local credit unions as well as major national
lenders. 85 For example, the Wall Street Journal recently estimated that 40% of
all General Motors automobile sales are financed through the General Motors
Acceptance Corporation ("GMAC").86
Although the details vary by dealership and by lender, the industry
practice up until the litigation was fairly uniform and tells a damning story.
When a car buyer worked with a dealer to arrange financing, the dealer would
send the customer's credit information to a potential lender. The potential
lender would then respond with a private message to the dealer that would offer
the interest rate at which the lender is willing to lend, called the "buy rate."
87
84. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170-71.
85. Mark A. Cohen, Imperfect Competition in Auto Lending: Subjective Markup, Racial
Disparity, and Class Action Litigation (Working Paper Oct. 2006), available at
http://www.appam.org/conferences/fall/madison2006/sessions/downloads/10393.doc.
86. Gregory Zuckerman & Mark Whitehouse, Auto Maker Ponders Selling Stake in
Lucrative GMAC Finance Unit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2005, at Al, A10. Cohen also estimated
that, in 2002, American Honda Credit Corporation financed 38% of all Honda automobile sales.
Cohen, supra note 85, at 12.
87. See, e.g., Deposition of Kelly, Willis et al. v. America Honda Fin. Corp. (AHFC), No.
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But lenders usually encouraged and permitted the dealer to mark up this buy
rate if the dealer could induce the borrower to sign a loan agreement with a
higher interest rate. The lender of the marked-up loan would often immediately
pay the dealer-sometimes thousands of dollars-for passing on the inflated
contract. 88 For example, Nissan's financial arm, the Nissan Motors Acceptance
Corporation ("NMAC"), might tell a dealership that they were willing to lend a
buyer money at a 6% interest rate, but that they would pay the dealership $2800
if the dealership could get the buyer to sign an 11% loan. The buyer would
never be told that the dealership was marking up the loan and profiting on the
markup. The dealership and the lender would split the expected profits from the
markup, with the dealership taking the lion's share.
8 9
Lenders did not allow dealer markups on all of their loans. Some loan
programs prohibited (or sharply restricted) dealers from marking up the buy
rate. But until the class action lawsuits were filed in 1998, many of the lenders
had loan programs that placed no limit on the amount the buy rate could be
marked up. Indeed, even after the litigation was filed, many lenders routinely
allowed up to a three-percentage-point dealer markup on a subset of their loan
programs. 90 This meant that a 6% buy rate could still be marked up to 9%,
which amounts to a 50% increase in the price of borrowing money.
The policy of allowing markups on certain loan programs created two
potential sources of inequality. First, the lenders' decision to selectively ban
markups on certain types of loans could induce a disparate racial impact if
minority borrowers were less likely to qualify for the no-markup or low-
markup loans. Second, the lenders' decision to grant dealers markup discretion,
instead of requiring a standardized across-the-board markup, created the
possibility that dealers would disproportionately burden minorities with loans
that allowed markup.
Lenders' policies for setting higher buy rates for borrowers with poorer
credit scores also had a disparate impact against African American buyers,
3-02-0490, at 61 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 8, 2004):
Q. Do your disclosure policies include disclosing the buy rate to the consumer?
A. The buy rate that we-that we have from particular outlet? No.
Q. And do your disclosure policies include disclosing the markup to the consumer?
A. No need to. No.
Q. Do your disclosure policies include disclosing the existence of markup?
A. No need to. No.
88. See Stephen Brobeck, Opinion, Dealer Finance Reserve Should Be Dumped: Markup
Caps Help, But They Don't End Abuses and Discrimination, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Feb. 21, 2005,
at 14; Sarah A. Webster, Bad Rap or a Bad Buy?: Dealers Defend Financing, But Consumer
Groups Seek Changes, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 6, 2004, at IA.
89. A similar system of undisclosed markups has existed in the relationship between
home-mortgage lenders and brokers (often with similar disparate impacts on minority borrowers).
See HOWELL E. JACKSON & JEREMY BERRY, KICKBACKS OR COMPENSATION: THE CASE OF YIELD
SPREAD PREMIUMS 9 (2002), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/
pdfs/january drafl.pdf.
90. Webster, supra note 88, at IA.
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because African American applicants, as an empirical matter, had poorer credit
scores on average than white borrowers. 91 But the plaintiffs in this litigation
were careful not to challenge the disparate racial impact of the lender's buy rate
policies. 92 The plaintiffs in this litigation challenged only the disparate racial
impacts of the markups-markups that were almost completely unrelated to the
dealers' or the lenders' costs of doing business. 93 The markup component of
the APR is much closer to pure economic profit--or at least the markup
compensation that exceeds the dealer's cost of arranging the loan. It is highly
implausible that the markups could represent payments for the dealers' costs of
arranging the loan. This is because, when the lender and dealer negotiated loan
arrangement compensation, it was usually on the order of two or three hundred
dollars, which is much less than what the markup compensation often turns out
to be.
94
91. Mark A. Cohen, Report on the Racial Impact of AHFC's Finance Charge Markup
Policy, Willis et al. v. AHFC, at 39
(June 30, 2004), available at http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/cocounseling/content/
AHFCCohenReportAppendicesAC.pdf [hereinafter Cohen, AHFC Report].
92. The disparate impact created by tying buy rates to credit scores is potentially justified.
People with poorer credit scores are more likely to fail to pay back their loans or fail to pay them
back in a timely matter, and thus impose higher costs on lenders. See Avery et al., Credit Risk,
Credit Scoring, and the Performance of Home Mortgages, 82 FED. RES. BULL. 621, 631-36
(1996). Buy rate policies that allow interest rates to cover lenders' expected costs are
presumptively justified-even if they lead to minority borrowers disproportionately paying higher
interest rates. But buy rate policies that imposed grossly inflated rates on poorer-credit-score
borrowers might still be unjustified. If a poorer credit score imposes a 1% higher cost on a lender,
but the lender increases the buy rate by 2%, then this inflated, supra-competitive increment might,
according to the theory of this Article, be actionable.
93. Many of the lenders' programs did expose the dealer to a risk of borrower prepayment
or nonpayment for the first two or three payments of the loan. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Expert Report,
Claybrooks et al. v. Primus Auto. Fin. Serv., Inc., No. 3-02-0382, at 22 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 15,
2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Ayres, Primus Report]. For example, if the borrower paid
off the loan or failed to pay on the loan during this period, the dealer might have to pay back to the
lender the compensation for arranging the marked up loan. But the industry norm was that the
dealers did not bear the risk of paying back the principle if the borrower failed to pay. Testimony
from dealers revealed that the three-month risk of a dealership losing its markup compensation did
not restrain dealers from setting as high a hidden markup as they thought a borrower would be
willing to sign. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Expert Report, Cason et al. v. NMAC, No. 3-98-0223, at 37
(M.D. Tenn. May 25, 2001) (citing to deposition of Brent Adams) [hereinafter Ayres, NMAC
Report].
94. AHFC, for example, as of 2004, typically paid dealers a loan arrangement fee of just
$100 for promotional loans. Declaration of Ian Ayres, Willis et al. v. AHFC, No. 3-02-0490, at 7
(M.D. Tenn. Nov. 3, 2004) [hereinafter Ayres, AHFC Declaration]. In an unrelated example, one
particular New York dealer agreed, as part of a settlement with the Attorney General, to fixed-fee
compensation for loan arrangement, and estimated the fees would be in this same range. NY
Dealer Sees Spitzer Settlement As A Win, CAR DEALER INSIDER, April 5, 2004, at 1 ("Metzner [the
dealership owner] figures the average fee is about $225, but will rise to $300-350 as more lenders
come on board and he negotiates higher fees.").
A prime example of the disparate impact of selective markup caps was the "recent college
graduate" programs offered by several lenders, which offered special interest rates that dealers
were not allowed to mark up. Just as the employer's high school diploma requirement in Griggs
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Indeed, the standard industry practice with regard to all advertised
"special APR" loans was to prohibit dealerships from marking up the
subsidized interest rates. But these below-below market rates-including the
0% specials that were ubiquitous in the wake of 9/11-were usually only
available for "well-qualified" borrowers who had superior credit scores. In
practice, these special APRs created a "double whammy" that could
dramatically increase the disparity in interest rates paid. Imagine that a given
lender was willing to lend to Smith at 6% and Jones at 9% (because Smith had
a better credit history). After 9/11 and the special APRs for well-qualified
borrowers, Smith might walk away from dealership with a 0% loan, shielded
from dealer markup, while Jones might walk away with a rate as high as 12%.
What started out as a justified 3% difference might become an APR that was
twelve percentage points higher. Because minorities disproportionately fail to
qualify as "well-qualified borrowers," they not only lose out on the APR buy-
down, they are disproportionately subject to markups that are not related to
dealer or lender cost.
The impact of the markup policies of five major automobile lenders-
Primus, AHFC, Ford Motor Credit Corporation (FMCC), NMAC, and
GMAC-is reported in Table 1.
95
The table summarizes an analysis of over 3 million car loans including
more than 350,000 loans to African American borrowers. On average, African
American borrowers paid almost $400 more in markups than white borrowers
in loans from these lenders. The average markup for white borrowers was $302
while the average markup for African American borrowers was $695, which
was more than twice as high. Across the five lenders, white borrowers had a
31% chance of receiving a loan with a markup, while 53.2% of loans to African
American borrowers were marked up.
96
induced a disparate racial impact, the (recent) college diploma requirement at times caused a
disparate racial impact in markup loans as African American borrowers were less likely to qualify
for this favorable program. See for example Ayres, NMAC Report, supra note 93, at 19 n.24
("Whites were 19 percent more likely than African-Americans to borrow under defendant's recent
college graduate program"-but noting that this program only produced a small amount of the
overall racial disparity).
95. This data is taken from Mark Cohen's expert report in the Primus Automotive
Financial Services ("Primus") litigation. Mark A. Cohen, Expert Report on the Racial Impact of
Primus' Finance Charge Markup Policy, Claybrooks et al. v. Primus Auto. Fin. Serv., Inc., (Sept.
20, 2004), available at www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/
cocounseling/content/PrimusCohen.pdf [hereinafter Cohen, Primus Report]. Primus is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Ford Motor Corporation and services many non-Ford brands such as Mazda,
Volvo and Jaguar. I have also worked as an expert in litigation involving the following lenders
AHFC, FMCC, NMAC, GMAC, DaimlerChrysler Financial Company ("DFC"), Among the
financial institutions were AmSouth Bank Corp ("AmSouth"), WFS Financial Inc. ("WFS"),
BankOne, Bank of America, and U.S. Bank.
96. The fact that the median white borrower paid no markup is itself strong evidence of
the disparate impact of lender programs that selectively banned dealer markup. The median white
borrower paid zero markup not because whites were disproportionately adept at bargaining. Most
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Table 1
Primus AHFC FMCC NMAC GMAC
Jan.-01 Jun.-99 Jan.-94 Mar.-93 Jan.-99 Weighted
Jun.-05 Mar.-03 Apr.-03 Sept.-00 Apr.-03 Average
Total Sample Size Analyzed 219,278 383,652 855,989 310,718 151,191 3281550
3
African American Sample 35,797 44,321 99,347 59,044 127,983 366492
Whites in Sample 183,481 339,331 756,642 251,674 1,383.93 29150670
9
Percent of Costumers Who Are 16.3% 11.6% 11.6% 19.0% 8.5% 11.2%
African Americans
Average Amount of Financed-African $17,655. 19,333.0 $19,383. $16,749. $20,443. 19500.66
Americans 00 0 00 00 00
Average Amount of Financed-Whites $18,408. 17,656.0 $20,563. $15,922. $21,530. 20085.22
00 0 00 00 00
% with Markup-African Americans 61.8% 43.3 % 48.5 % 71.8 % 53.4 % 53.2 %
% with Markup-Whites 41.1% 22.2% 30.9% 467 % 28.2% 30.8%
Additional Percentage ofAfrican 20.7% 21.2% 176% 251% 25.2% 22.4%
Americans w/ Markup
Relative Odds Ratio % -African 232 268 210 289 292
Americans
Relative Odds Ratio % -Whites 43 37 47.6 34 34
Average Markup-African Americans $862 557 684 970 656 695.23
Average Markup-Whites $475 227 337 462 244 302.35
Additional Markup Paid By African $387 330 347 508 412 392.88
Americans I
Ratio of African Americans to White 1.81 2.45 2.03 2.10 2.69 2.4
Markup
#Standard Deviations-Incidents of 66.2 91.5 104.1 99 178.8 134.0
markup- (Actual to Expected) I I
The distributions of markups were highly skewed to the right. For
example, over half of white borrowers paid no markup at all. But 10% of
GMAC borrowers paid more than a $1000 markup and the top decile of NMAC
customers paid a markup of more than a $1600. 9 7 The top 10% of GMAC
borrowers produced more than 63% of the GMAC total markup profits, while a
mere 5% of GMAC borrowers produced 42% of the total markup profits.98 The
whites were unaware that APRs were negotiable. Rather the higher proportion of no markup loans
can be attributed to a higher proportion of whites qualifying for no-markup loan products. See
Mark A. Cohen, Report on the Racial Impact of GMAC's Finance Charge
Markup Policy, Coleman et al. v. GMAC
55 tbls. 20A & 20B, 56 tbls. 21A & 21B, 57 tbls. 22A & 22B (Aug. 29, 2003),
available at http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/cocounseling/GMAC/CohenReport.pdf
[hereinafter Cohen, GMAC Report].
97. Cohen, GMAC Report, supra note 96, at 58 tbl. 23A. Honda Finance charged 10% of
its borrowers more than a $1000 markup. Mark A. Cohen, Report on the Racial Impact of AHFC's
Finance Charge Markup Policy, Willis et al. v. AHFC 55 tbl. 16A (June 30, 2004), available at
http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/cocounseling/content/
AHFCCohenReportAppendicesAC.pdf [hereinafter Cohen, AHFC Report]. Primus charged 10%
of its borrowers more than a $1700 markup. Cohen, Primus Report, supra note 95, at 35 tbl. 14.
98. Cohen, GMAC Report, supra note 96, at 28 tbl. 8. The story was much the same at the
other lenders: The 5% of GMAC borrowers paying the highest markup paid 42% of the total
markup profits. Id. at 3. Similarly, in FMCC, 25% of FMCC borrowers produced 53.1% of the
total markup profit. Mark A. Cohen, Preliminary Report on the Racial Impact of FMCC's Finance
Charge Markup Policy, Jones et al. v. FMCC 36 tbl. 8 (Jan. 9, 2004), available at
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disparate racial impacts were even more pronounced with regard to borrowers
in this right-hand tail of the markup distributions; the most profitable borrowers
were disproportionately African American. For example, while African
American borrowers represented only 8.5% of the overall GMAC sample of
loans, they represented 21.7% of borrowers in the top decile of markup
profitability. 99 Conversely, African Americans were only 8.5% of GMAC
borrowers, but they paid 19.9% of the markup profits. 1
00
The racial disparities tended to grow even larger further down the tail. For
example, in the fifteen states for which the data was coded by race, the top 500
Primus borrowers, who each paid more than a $4000 markup, were
disproportionately black: while African Americans were only 16.3% of the
Primus borrowers, they represented 30.2% of these 500 most-profitable
markups. 101 The racial disparity was even more extreme for the top 100 GMAC
borrowers in Alabama, who each paid more than a $5000 markup: African
Americans were only 13.9% of Alabama GMAC borrowers, but represented 62
of these 100 most-profitable markups. 1
02
It is not plausible that markup disparities of this magnitude are driven by
the costs of doing business with certain types of customers. When loan
programs prohibit markups, lender compensation to dealers for loan
arrangement is on the order of $200 to $400. But the data consistently revealed
a substantial number of loans with markups above $1000 and even $1500. And
the highest markups in the data were often on the order of $3000 or $4000.
Four thousand dollars cannot be described as compensation for the cost of
doing business plus a fair profit margin. These supra-competitive markups
effectively demonstrated price-gouging by the lenders and dealers.
The term "price-gouging" has been legally defined. A number of states
http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/cocounseling/content/FMCC_Cohen.pdf [hereinafter
Cohen, FMCC Report]. Ten percent of Honda borrowers produced more than 65% of the total
markup profits (a mere 5% of Honda Finance borrowers produced 41% of the total markup
profits). Cohen, AHFC Report, supra note 91, at 29 tbl 6. At Primus, 10% of borrowers produced
more than 45% of the total markup profits (a mere 5% of Primus borrowers produced 26.7% of
the total markup profits). Cohen, Primus Report, supra note 95, at 22 tbl. 6.
99. Cohen, GMAC Report, supra note 96, at 28 tbl. 8. Again, the same story was seen
elsewhere: while black borrowers were only 11.6% of the overall Honda sample of loans, they
represented 26.5% of borrowers in the top decile of markup profitability. Cohen, AHFC Report,
supra note 91, at 29 tbl. 6. While black borrowers were only 16.3% of the overall Primus sample
of loans, they represent 30.2% of borrowers in this top decile of markup profitability. Cohen,
Primus Report, supra note 95, at 22 tbl. 6. Or analyzed alternatively, African Americans are only
16.3% of Primus borrowers, but they pay 26.1% of the markup profits. Id.
100. Cohen, GMAC Report, supra note 96, at 28 tbl. 8.
101. Cohen, Primus Report, supra note 95, app. D. Similarly, the top 500 Honda borrowers
(from the fifteen race-coded states), who each paid more than a $3600 markup, were
disproportionately black: African Americans are only 11.47% of the Honda Finance borrowers in
the fifteen states but they represented 36.4% of these 500 most-profitable markups. Cohen, AHFC
Report, supra note 91, app. D.
102. Cohen, GMAC Report, supra note 96, app. D.
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expressly prohibit price-gouging in the aftermath of a natural disaster. For
example, a Tennessee statute makes it unlawful:
to charge any other person a price for any consumer food item; repair
or construction services; emergency supplies; medical supplies;
building materials; gasoline; transportation, freight, and storage
services; or housing, that is grossly in excess of the price generally
charged for the same or similar goods or services in the usual course of
business immediately prior to the events giving rise to the state of103
emergency.
Similarly, the New York price-gouging statute prohibits "grossly excessive" or
"unconscionably excessive" prices.' 04 The statute fills out the meaning of the
excessive price standard:
[P]rima facie proof that a violation of this section has occurred shall
include evidence that (i) the amount charged represents a gross
disparity between the price of the goods or services which were the
subject of the transaction and their value measured by the price at
which such consumer goods or services were sold or offered for sale
by the defendant in the usual course of business immediately prior to
the onset of the abnormal disruption of the market or (ii) the amount
charged grossly exceeded the price at which the same or similar goods
or services were readily obtainable by other consumers in the trade
area. A defendant may rebut a prima facie case with evidence that
additional costs not within the control of the defendant were imposed
on the defendant for the goods or services.
These statutes make it clear that the term "price-gouging" is more than a free-
form pejorative conclusion that the price charged is too high.
The markups observed in automobile lending would clearly violate the
gouging element of these price-gouging statutes. The amounts charged "grossly
exceed the price at which [similar] services were readily obtainable by other
customers in the trade area." Indeed, the analogy holds water in both directions.
The types of pricing prohibited by the price-gouging states are not the types
that are "consistent with business necessity." In real-world settings, it may at
times be difficult to distinguish policies that allow a business to cover its cost
and earn a reasonable economic return from those that allow a business to earn
supra-competitive profits. However, the facts of the automotive lending cases
did not present a hard case. The markups paid were not just supra-competitive,
they were "grossly in excess of the price generally charged."1
0 5
The price-gouging statutes have traditionally only regulated pricing during
emergencies or natural disasters. 106 But the evidence from automotive lending
103. Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-5103 (2001).
104. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 396-r (3)(b) (2006).
105. Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-5103 (2001).
106. Richard Givens defended the traditional limited scope of the statute:
2007]
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shows that price-gouging can persist over longer periods when consumers have
limited information and sellers act to keep buyers uninformed. This Article has
not suggested making price-gouging illegal in all cases, but it does suggest that
price-gouging that disparately impacts minorities should be at least as
problematic as advantage-taking in the shadow of natural disasters.' 
07
Thus, the markup litigation provides a persuasive example for our
intuitions about the central thesis of this Article that exploiting market power
should not justify profitable policies that cause disparate racial impacts. We are
confronted with a set of lender policies that clearly produced a pronounced
disparate racial impact; at NMAC, for example, the median markup for white
borrowers was $0, while the median markup for black borrowers was over
$750.'08 In addition, the lender policies were a but-for cause of that disparity
because there would be no racial disparity if Nissan dealer compensation was
placed at a fixed amount. The lender policies were also clearly profitable
beyond a competitive level. In exchange for engaging in a paper transaction
(typically demanding only a minimal amount of time), where the dealer usually
bore no risk of repaying the principal, dealerships often reaped thousands of
dollars in profits. This is not the increased profitability of a policy that ensures
that costs are covered, but rather the increased profitability of prices that far
exceeded cost.
This litigation forces us to ask whether policies that increase profits via
supra-competitive pricing are a defense to a prima facie showing of disparate
impact. In my capacity as an expert witness, I was convinced that no court
would accept the profitability of these markups as a defense to what the data
laid so bare: a profound disparate impact. Indeed, I felt that just forcing the
The ability of the market to ration supplies through higher prices and encourage
additional output because of the profit offered works only over a sufficient period of
time and cannot avoid cutoff of supply to many when a spike-like price rise occurs
for a temporary period, giving a windfall to holders of supply where encouragement
of output cannot take effect within that time span. Over a longer period, antitrust
rather than antigouging law becomes the protective legal principle most likely to turn
out to work and to be useful. Price controls which continue in effect for an
appreciable period cause shortages to develop rather than be overcome, and lead to
the necessity for rationing supplies, with debilitating results that increase with time.
Practice Commentaries, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 396-r (McKinney 2004).
107. Price-gouging after a natural disaster, while inequitable, can actually enhance
allocative efficiency. When the demand for batteries is greater than the supply, then charging
higher prices may do a better job than a lottery or first-come, first-serve allocations in helping to
assure that the batteries are not used for playing Gameboy. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L.
Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the
Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 735 (1986) (acknowledging that certain perceived inequitable
practices may be economically efficient). Price-gouging to a subset of auto loan borrowers would
do absolutely nothing to enhance allocative efficiency, however.
108. Mark A. Cohen, Supplemental Report on Racial Impact of NMAC's Finance Charge
Markup Policy, Cason et al. v. NMAC 60 Tbl. 22 (Aug. 28, 2001) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Cohen, NMAC Report].
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defendant attorneys or experts to utter the words "price-gouging," even if only
to deny it, would go a long way toward convincing a court to accept the central
thesis of this Article. 1
09
But of course my voice was not the only one heard in this litigation. The
defendant lenders retained the services of three extraordinarily capable
academics-in turn Richard Epstein, James Heckman and George Priest-to
rebut the idea that policies that produce supra-competitive profits do not justify
what would otherwise be an actionable disparate impact. These experts put
forward a number of arguments for why liability was not appropriate given the
facts of this case." 0 Many of their opinions challenged whether plaintiffs had
even established a prima facie case of disparate impact."' A rehashing of that
statistical and data-driven debate is not my aim in this Article. Instead, in the
remainder of this section, I will focus on how these experts responded to the
justification theory propounded in this Article.
B. Richard Epstein- "Competition Drives Out Unearned Rents"
University of Chicago law professor and titan of the law-and-economics
movement, Richard Epstein was hired by NMAC to rebut my price-gouging
argument in the first class-action automobile lending suit."12 Epstein's central
argument was to deny the premise of price-gouging. His elegant and simple
syllogism went as follows: (1) the credit market is very competitive; (2)
competition drives out supra-competitive pricing; (3) therefore, the interest-rate
pricing must be competitive. As Epstein testified in his deposition:
[Ayres and Cohen's] argument was that the markup was an unearned
increment by dealers. I knew that that had to be a preposterous
statement of economic reality. Nobody gets a free lunch for that long,
not on hundreds of thousands of transactions every day. And by your
account, the dealers have done absolutely nothing to earn that money.
That cannot be...
109. My reasoning parallels the attempt of Alan Dershowitz in representing Klaus Von
Bulow to lure the prosecution on appeal into "taking the bait" and rearguing the question of guilt.
ALAN DERSHOWITZ, REVERSAL OF FORTUNE (1986).
110. For example, defendants in various cases argued that: (1) Defendants were not
"lenders," but merely repurchased loans that had been initiated by dealers. See Expert Report of
Richard A. Epstein, Cason et al. v. NMAC, No. 3-98-0223, (M.D. Tenn. July 12, 2001)
[hereinafter Epstein, NMAC Report]. (2) Defendants were justified in allowing markups, because
if they didn't allow dealers to price-gouge, dealers would have directed the business to another
lender that allowed price-gouging. Expert Report of George L. Priest, Willis et al. v. AHFC, No.
3-02-0490, (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Priest, Primus Report]. (3) Defendants were
justified in selective markup caps because they had a legitimate motive to try to sell cars. Epstein,
NMAC Report supra.
111. For example, as discussed below, George Priest argued evidence of disparate impact
with regard to markups was not sufficient to prove that plaintiffs suffered a disparate impact with
regard to the net impact of the transaction. See Priest, Primus Report, supra note 110.
112. Cason et al. v. NMAC, No. 3-98-0223, 212 F.R.D. 518 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).
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Competition drives out unearned rents, and that's the only thing that one needs
to know to figure out why [Ayres's] report is wrong.l3
In his deposition, Epstein's a priori faith in the power of competition to
eliminate all supra-competitive pricing bordered on the non-falsifiable:
Q: So one basis of your opinion is your assumption that market forces
work efficiently [?] and this market is particularly efficient, so this
discrimination could not possibly exist. You agree and one of your
assumptions in your report is that the markup charges are related to the
work performed by the dealer?
A. Uhm-hhm.
Q. And so if those two assumptions were proven to be false, then
would you be prepared to withdraw the opinion in your report?
A. Again, I mean, proven to be false-what I would do is-no, I
would ask the following question because I simply do not believe that
unearned increments exist in this form. 1
14
By arguing that supra-competitive pricing is just not possible, Epstein was able
to avoid confronting whether such pricing would be justified. 115
For Epstein, the great dispersion in markups was driven by differences in
dealers' loan arrangement costs. Even though Nobel Prize-winning economist
and founder of the Chicago School George Stigler long ago understood that the
price dispersion in new car prices could not plausibly be attributable to
differences in cost,' 16 Epstein supported the notion of purely cost-based
pricing. Even stark evidence to the contrary, for example that the median
NMAC markup for whites was $0 while 10% of NMAC borrowers paid more
than a $1600 markup, did not change Professor Epstein's position on the role of
113. Deposition of Richard A. Epstein, Cason et al. v. NMAC, No. 3-98-0223, (M.D. Tenn.
July 30, 2001) [hereinafter Epstein, NMAC deposition], at 86.
114. Id. at 136-37. Professor Epstein's indifference to the factual record can also be seen in
this telling moment of his deposition:
Q. Let me ask you, do you recall-
A. I can't even recall reading the depositions or doing anything with them.
Id. at 52.
115. While not a direct assault on my theory of justification, Professor Epstein did argue
that my theory of disparate impact would essentially render superfluous disparate treatment
liability: "[Ayres'] version of the world is essentially one in which there's no percentage
whatsoever for using a disparate treatment case anywhere, ever, because you will always do better
as a plaintiff by using a disparate impact case." Epstein, NMAC Deposition, supra note 113, at 83.
But this criticism clearly misses the mark. The theory of disparate impact justification suggested
both in this Article and in my expert testimony would still allow defendants to avoid liability for
policies that help them cover their costs of doing business. Cost-based statistical discrimination on
the basis of race might therefore be justified under a disparate impact theory but would not be
justified under disparate treatment analysis.
116. Stigler, in considering whether the dispersion observed in new car pricing could be
attributed to cost-based differences, concluded: "it would be metaphysical, and fruitless, to assert
that all dispersion is due to heterogeneity." GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF
INDUSTRY 172 (1968).
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competition.
Indeed, Epstein in his expert report suggested that there was a sharp
dichotomy between the pricing of loans for two different types of borrowers:
As a general matter, credit markets are divided into two kinds of
transactions: those in which there are no (or tiny) risks of
nonpayment, and those in which there is a large but uncertain risk of
nonpayment. A treasury bill is the prime example of a riskless form
of security, whose interest rate represents only a fee that the borrower
pays the lender for the use of the money over time. No private
borrower has quite the credit of the United States government, but
many purchasers of cars (homes, and other consumer goods) have
never defaulted on any loan or credit transaction and thus present a
well-nigh riskless position. Dealing in these markets is a straight
interest calculation that involves little business acumen, for everyone
will set about the same rate for the transactions. Matters are far more
complicated for high-risk credit transactions where the risk of
nonpayment, late payment, or partial payment is paramount. In these
cases, the negotiated interest must be sufficient to compensate for the
additional risk. .17
Epstein reasoned that it was these additional difficulties of arranging loans
for high-risk borrowers that justified the high dealer compensation.
But Epstein did not confront the evidence that even borrowers with good
credit scores exhibited substantial disparities in markups. Cohen found that the
average markups for black borrowers placed by NMAC in the best credit tier
were $361 dollars higher than the average markup for whites placed in the
same credit tier. The average markup for black borrowers in Tier 1 was $660,
versus the $299 markup for white borrowers in Tier 1. 118 Epstein's own report
opines that for these "well-nigh riskless" borrowers "[d]ealing in these markets
is a straight interest calculation that involves little business acumen for
117. Epstein, NMAC Report, supra note 110, at 19-20.
118. Cohen, NMAC Report, supra note 108, at tbl. 20. The persistence of racial disparity
across credit tiers was found for other lenders as well. For example, Cohen's analysis of GMAC
borrowers found substantial disparities within each credit tier for every year analyzed:
Average Markup by Race and Year by Credit Tier
Credit Tier = S Credit Tier = A Credit Tier BYear Black White Diff. Black White Diff. Black White Diff
1999 $384 S127 S257 $682 S244 $438 $867 $446 1$421
2000 $367 Sill S256 $597 S210 S38 $883 $407 S476
2001 S321 S92 S229 $498 $158 $340 S790 $354 S436
2002 $308 $106 S202 $503 $195 $308 $765 $387 S378
2003 $283 $100 $183 $459 $194 $265 $645 $373 S272
OveraU $323 $102 $221 $523 $191 $332 $786 $384 $402
Cohen, supra note 85, at tbl. 4.
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everyone will set about the same rate for the transactions."' 19 Epstein's theory
suggests that these borrowers would receive uniform and small markups. But
the data are starkly at odds with his faith in market competition. Plainly, on
Epstein's own logic, cost could not have been driving disparities as wide as
these. Something else was at work.
In February of 2003, the NMAC litigation was settled and NMAC agreed
to three core remedies. 12 First, NMAC agreed to limit its markup to 3
percentage points "above NMAC's buy rates for each credit tier,"'121 2 percent
for longer-term finance agreements, and 2 percent for used vehicles. 2 2 Second,
it agreed over the course of five years to offer 625,000 African American and
Hispanic borrowers pre-approved no-markup loans. 12 3 Finally, NMAC agreed
to engage in substantially enhanced programs of disclosure and consumer
education. 124
C. James Heckman -
All Profits Are Justified
In the next case to reach the deposition and expert report stage, GMAC
retained the services of one of the great econometricians in the world, Nobel
Prize-winning economist James Heckman. Heckman's report in the GMAC
litigation concentrated on responding to the business justification argument at
the center of this Article. 1
25
119. Epstein, NMAC Report, supra note 110.
120. Settlement Agreement, Cason et al. v. NMAC, No. 3-98-0223 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 18,
2003), available at
http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/cocounseling/content/settlement-agreement.PDF.
121. Id. at 15.
122. Id. at 16.
123. Id. at 24. See also infra note 127 (commenting on the implications of race-dependent
affirmative lending).
124. The outline of the settlement agreement explains, "NMAC will contribute $1 million
over the next five years to three national consumer financial education programs." NMAC also
promised to "mail an educational brochure in English and Spanish to existing customers annually
for five years." And NMAC agreed to "provide written disclosure on NMAC financing contracts
forms that a customer's annual percentage rate may be negotiable with the dealer."
Outline of Settlement Agreement, Cason et al. v. NMAC,
http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/cocounseling/content/outline.pdf.
In contrast to the $63 million benefits accruing to African American borrowers directly
(through no-markup loans and markup caps) and indirectly through NMAC's financing of
consumer education), the plaintiffs' attorneys were paid $6 million. Overall, in the settled cases
Cohen estimates that legal fees have averaged less than 5% of minority benefits. See Mark A.
Cohen, Declaration on Valuation of Settlement, Cason et al. v. NMAC [hereinafter Cohen,
NMAC Declaration on Valuation of Settlement].
125. James J. Heckman, Expert Report, Coleman et al. v. GMAC, No. 3-98-0211 (M.D.
Tenn. Dec. 15, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Heckman, GMAC Report]. One might thus
have expected Heckman to respond to the central econometric claim in my report, as well as the
actual econometrics performed by plaintiffs' expert Mark Cohen. In my report, I opined that in
disparate impact cases, it was important to intentionally exclude from regression analysis controls
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How did Heckman's report critique the idea that policies which have a
disparate impact are less justified if they extract supra-competitive profits than
if they allow sellers to cover their costs? Heckman, like Epstein, tried to avoid
the question, by denying the possibility of supra-competitive pricing. 126 But
unlike Epstein, Heckman did not say that the higher markups track the higher
costs of loan arrangement for some customers. He instead argued that the
higher markup profits represented returns on entrepreneurial effort.' a7 This
section will show that Heckman's theory ultimately represents an unfalsifiable
conviction that firms "need to maximize profits to survive."1
2 8
Heckman's theory that all profits, no matter how high, are justifiable
returns to entrepreneurial effort is expressly Schumpeterian. Heckrnan states in
his report:
Those who innovate make what Schumpeter called an entrepreneurial
profit. The entrepreneurial activity is distinct from the investment
activity which often bears the risk of the entrepreneur's projects.
Hence the entrepreneurial profit is distinct from and in addition to any
normal return to capital. 1
29
This theory leaves no possibility for market failure or supra-competitive
profit because the additional revenue merely compensates entrepreneurs for
their innovation. Heckman concludes: "[The] extra profits are not an
illegitimate 'market failure' as Professor Ayres claims. Quite the opposite, they
for variables that did not provide a plausible business justification. Ian Ayres, Expert Report,
Coleman et al. v. GMAC, No. 3-98-0211, at 8 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 29, 2003) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Ayres, GMAC Report]. Even though econometricians are used to worrying about the
problem of omitted variable bias, I showed that in disparate impact cases the problem of "included
variable bias" was more important. Ayres, GMAC Report supra, at 7-8. For example, in the
original disparate impact case, Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424, it would be inappropriate to control for
possession of a high school diploma in a regression trying to predict whether African Americans
were less likely to be hired or promoted, because the goal in disparate impact cases is to determine
whether nonracial factors unjustifiably caused employment disparities. See Ian Ayres, Three Tests
for Measuring Unjustified Disparate Impacts in Organ Transplantation The Problem of "Included
Variable" Bias, 48 PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY & MED., at S68-S70 (2005). To test for unjustified
disparate impacts, it is important not to control for any factors that do not provide a plausible
business justification. In a disparate treatment case, on the other hand, controlling for whether an
applicant had a high school diploma would be appropriate, because the goal is to see whether there
was a racial disparity in employment after controlling for all plausible non-race factors. See id.
Heckman should have responded directly to this analysis. In fact, he had recently commented
on a conference article of mine applying just this idea of included variable bias to the issue of
disparate racial impacts in medicine. Robert Bomholz & James J. Heckman, Measuring Disparate
Impacts and Extending Disparate Impact Doctrine to Organ Transplantation 3 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10946 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w10946. But only a few pages of his report in the GMAC case concerned the included
variable bias theory. See Heckman, GMAC Report, supra (only 3 of the 54 pages).
126. Heckman, GMAC Report supra note 125, at 18.
127. Id. at 17-18.
128. Id. at 2.
129. Id. at 17. See generally JOSEPH ALOIS SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY (1947).
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are the engine that drives economic development and growth.",'3 Under this
theory, market failure is simply not possible. Heckman does not have to
consider whether price-gouging would be legally unjustifiable because there
seems to be no such thing as price-gouging, in this view.
To Heckman, the Schumpeterian theory of profits as a driving force for
innovation in the economy did not seem misplaced in justifying dealership loan
markups. He explained:
Acts of entrepreneurship do not need to be spectacular. A willingness
to finance the sale of a product to someone who could not otherwise
afford it, or in a locality that was not previously being served, are
forms of innovation. Under accepted economic theory, these would
entitle even as mundane an economic actor as a vehicle dealer to an
entrepreneurial profit. 131
While Heckman casts the dealer-entrepreneurs in a positive light as finding
new ways to finance "someone who could not otherwise afford it," on the
ground his report is trying to justify GMAC's policy of allowing $5000
dealership markups on hundreds of loans. 132 The true innovation lies not in
new products or in servicing a new niche of clients, but instead in devising new
ways to extract higher and higher markups from the unwary.
At core, Heckman argues that if firms fail to extract as large a profit as is
legally possible, they may not expect to survive in the Schumpeterian world of
dynamic competition.133 Heckman seems to believe that Microsoft would put
its corporate existence at risk if it dropped the $299 price of Windows XP
Professional by a single dollar. The reader may think that I have overstated
Heckman's view. It may seem that he could not have argued that it is a business
necessity for firms with market power to maximize profits to supra-competitive
levels. But Heckman argued:
Professor Ayres contends "Exacting supra-competitive revenues from
a class of consumers-not because they impose higher costs on the
seller but merely because the seller has the power to do so-is not
consistent with business necessity." But adopting practices to make the
greatest profit subject to obeying the law is a business necessity.
For a Schumpeterian, there is no such thing as market power because dynamic
competition in Heckman's words "annihilates" permanent surplus value.
135
130. Heckman, GMAC Report, supra note 125, at 17. See also id. at 18 ("The presence of
profits is not evidence of market failure, as claimed by Professor Ayres. The expectation of profits
to be made provides the incentive to enter existing markets and to create entirely new markets by
inventing entirely new ways to meet basic demands.").
131. Id. at 18.
132. Id. at 17.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 18.
135. Id. at 17 ("The competitive mechanism tolerates no permanent surplus values, but
annihilates them...").
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Heckman concluded: "[I]f 'legitimate' has any meaning in economics, the
foregoing discussion shows that increasing revenues and profits is legitimate,
indeed is the most legitimate activity of any business in a free market."'
36
The Schumpeterian competitive mechanism might be reasonably accurate
in the long run. But, the Keynesian retort that "in the long run we are all dead"
is reason enough to be concerned about short run anti-competitive deviations.
The difference between Heckman and myself is not the difference between
dynamic and static analysis of competition; at core, the difference is
Heckman's unconditional faith in corporate efficiency versus my empirically
contingent views about the efficiency or non-efficiency of particular sellers.
Heckman dismisses my analysis as a "polemic" and biased: "Professor Ayres
presents, in the guise of economics, what is really his own normative
system." 137
But if we follow Heckman's argument to its logical end, much of antitrust
and consumer protection law must fail, as there should be a profitability
defense to all business conduct. There is circularity in Heckman's claim that
maximizing profits "subject to obeying the law is a business necessity.' ' 3 8 If
the law proscribes price-gouging that has a disparate impact against minorities,
then according to Heckman's own analysis it is no longer a business necessity.
In such a world, lenders who refrained from price-gouging would not be put at
a Schumpeterian disadvantage by earning less profits because by assumption
the law would prohibit price-gouging by all lenders in the industry. 39
Unlike Epstein or Priest, Heckman rose to the bait and openly embraced
the wage-gouging hypothetical discussed above in Section I as being consistent
with business necessity:
Ayres then gives an example . . . "Consider . . . an employer who
institutes a policy of paying employees who are the primary care
136. Id. at 18.
137. Id. at 15. See also id. at 3 ("[Ayres] phrases his methodology in economic terms.
However his methodology depends on assumptions which fly in the face of fundamental
principles of economics as a science as well as the principles on which free markets are
founded.").
138. Id. at 18.
139. Heckman also claims that to forego a dollar of profit is economically equivalent to
incurring a dollar of cost and therefore that no "valid economic distinction can be drawn between
reducing cost and increasing revenue .... Id, at 2. Heckman opines: "If there is an opportunity to
earn revenue and the business fails to obtain it, economists refer to that as an 'opportunity cost.'
Foregoing revenue is an opportunity cost. In the context of negotiation, if a buyer is willing to pay
ten thousand dollars and the seller agrees to accept nine thousand dollars, that thousand dollars is
an opportunity cost. Thus Professor Ayres' distinction between revenue and cost is untenable." Id.
at 18. But many areas of the law distinguish between costs and opportunity costs. See, e.g., Fred S.
McChesney, Tortious Interference with Contract versus "Efficient" Breach: Theory and
Empirical Evidence, 28 J. LEGAL STUDIES 131 (1999) (in which the difference between monetary
costs and opportunity costs is central to the author's model of the tort law's intersection with
efficient breach theory).
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givers of school children a substantially lower salary." The example is
clever and polemical. Who could possibly justify such a heartless
employer's practice? [Ayres] goes on: "the employer should not be
able to justify paying caregivers less solely because these employees
have fewer employment alternatives (say, because of a lower ability to
move to other cities)....140
Heckman understands that the wage-gouging in this example is analogous to
the price-gouging of the dealers, but he sees nothing wrong with paying equally
productive workers less than they would earn in a competitive market:
"Differential search costs of individual persons can produce a result where an
identically productive individual gets a lower wage. Workers (male or female)
who search less typically get lower wages. Some low wage jobs provide
amenities like a location convenient for the employee's other activities such as
caregiving. ' ' 14 1 These sentences are carefully descriptive of economic
equilibrium, and in the absence of legal intervention might be true. But
Heckman was implicitly arguing that it is legitimate for employers to pay
employees less just because they are less able to search for alternative
employment. Implicitly he was arguing that it is a business necessity to wage-
gouge whenever possible. For Heckman, firms that do not extract the maximum
surplus allowed by the law from their employees and customers will not
survive.
But this theory is surely not true in the short run and would be even
weaker in a world where all competitors are restrained from extracting supra-
competitive profits that produce disparate impacts. It would be one thing for
Heckman to argue that dynamic competition will eventually give rise to a
Google-like competitor. But it is quite another to worry about a competitive
disadvantage when all other firms in the industry are similarly constrained.
Heckman's strong-form Schumpeterian views are not generally accepted in the
economics profession and they do not resonate with a reasonable interpretation
of "job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity." 142
Heckman has not universally embraced the idea that Schumpeterian
dynamic competition will cure all market imperfections, however. For example,
in a recent interview with the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Heckman
spoke about the implications of his finding that Title VII had a definite impact
140. Heckman, GMAC Report, supra note 125, at 31. Heckman goes on to suggest that in
this example I am imputing to the employer "an intention of disparate treatment of women
caregivers." Id. But this misses the mark. The example imputes to the employer only an intention
to increase its profits by lowering the wage paid to equally productive but less mobile workers. Of
course, an intention to wage gouge the vulnerable might result in a disparate impact on a protected
class.
141. Id.
142. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (1994). See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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on hiring in the Southern textile industry:
And to be honest, I found that some of my colleagues at Chicago were
very hostile to this finding, and some remain so. Some want to believe
that markets by themselves will solve problems like racial disparity.
Markets do many useful things, but they did not solve the problem of
race. Not in America. That's probably heresy to admit it as a Chicago
economist, but I became convinced that a doctrinaire notion that
markets would solve the problem of discrimination is false. 
43
This characterization not only contradicts his Chicago colleague Epstein, but
seems to be in tension with his testimony in this litigation.' 44
A court was never able to consider Heckman's views, because in February
of 2004 the GMAC litigation settled.145 The GMAC settlement paralleled the
basic structure of the NMAC settlement, but the terms were even more
favorable to the plaintiffs' class. 146
D. George Priest -
Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact Are the Same
The most recent defendants, including Honda, Primus, and Ford, have
turned to my friend and colleague, George Priest, as an expert witness. Priest's
testimony in the Primus litigation is particularly important, because the Primus
case was the first suit to go to trial.
Unlike his predecessors, Priest did not argue that there was no evidence of
supra-competitive pricing, he leveled another objection altogether:
There may be-in these top 100 examples here in Tennessee, there
may be individual examples of exploitation of consumers in one way
or another. I'm not saying that that doesn't occur. It's just exploitation
by the dealer. The suit should be brought against the dealer... 147
So while Epstein argued that price-gouging was impossible, and Heckman
argued that price-gouging was a business necessity, Priest instead argued that
"exploitation" might have taken place but that it was not the lender's fault.
Priest never needed to grapple with the question of whether profiting from anti-
competitive behavior was a business justification, because he limited his
143. Interview with James J. Heckman, The Region (June 2005),
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/05-06/heckman.cfm (emphasis added).
144. Id.
145. See Settlement Agreement, Coleman et al. v. GMAC, No. 3-98-0211 (M.D. Tenn.
Feb. 10, 2004), available at http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/
cocounseling/content/GMACSettlementAgrmt.pdf (Feb. 10, 2004) [hereinafter GMAC Settlement
Agreement].
146. For example GMAC agreed to a general markup cap of 2.5% (with a 2% cap for loans
with a maturity of more than 3 years). Id. at 11.
147. Testimony of George L. Priest, Borlay et al. v. Primus Auto. Fin. Serv., No. 3-02-
0382, (M.D. Tenn. March 10, 2005) [hereinafter Priest, Primus Testimony] at XVII: 55.
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testimony so as not to offer a business justification opinion. 148
Instead, Priest argued that plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination. His argument had two main components. First, he claimed
that plaintiffs had failed to prove a disparate racial impact because they had not
considered whether other aspects of the transaction explained the
disproportionate treatment that African American borrowers experienced on
their loan markups. 149 For example, Priest argued that lower car prices or
higher trade-in prices might have offset the higher markups. 50 Without
providing evidence that African American borrowers were in fact paying lower
car prices or higher trade-in prices, he argued that these offset effects were a
theoretical possibility and that plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie
case by presenting sufficient evidence to refute this possibility. 5'
Priest's argument disregarded Teal, which held that an employer was
liable for a disparate impact violation if any part of its selection process has a
disparate impact, even if the final result of the hiring process is racially
balanced. 152 In effect, Teal rejected what has come to be known as the "bottom
line defense."'
153
Even if a bottom line defense was available as a matter of law in these
types of ECOA claims, it was bizarre for Priest to argue that Cohen's empirical
evidence did not create a rebuttable prima facie case of racial disparity. Cohen
found substantial and statistically significant racial differences in the markup
148.
Q. Are you giving a legal opinion here today with respect to the business justification
legal defense in the case?
A. No, I'm not.
Id. at 192.
149. Deposition of George L. Priest, Willis et al. v. AHFC, No. 3-02-0490, at 81 (M.D.
Tenn. Nov. 8, 2004) [hereinafter Priest, AHFC Deposition].
150. Id. at 97.
151. Priest, Primus Report, supra note 110. Contrary to Priest's suggestion of financing-
profit-as-offset, in a study of an individual Atlanta car dealership that I performed as part of my
book, Pervasive Prejudice?, I found that there was a positive correlation between vehicle
profitability and financing profitability. See generally IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? 19-44
(2001). Cohen found a similar positive correlation in analyzing Honda data. Cohen, AHFC
Report, supra note 97, at 77.
152. 457 U.S. at 442.
153. Id. As the Teal Court defined the term, the "bottom line" theory of defense is that "an
employer's acts of racial discrimination in promotions-effected by an examination having
disparate impact-would not render the employer liable for the racial discrimination suffered by
employees barred from promotion if the 'bottom line' result of the promotional process was an
appropriate racial balance." Id. In Teal, the Court rejected the "bottom line" defense, holding that
it "does not preclude respondent employees from establishing a prima facie case, nor does it
provide petitioner employer with a defense to such a case." Id. As a normative matter, I am not a
great fan of Teal's argument. See Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 6, at 1517 (criticizing the
perverse effect of Teal's "no bottom line defense" holding as punishing firms for success in hiring
minorities). But its application to ECOA may be particularly appropriate if one concludes that
Congress did not intend for disparate treatment on non-credit terms to operate as a defense to
racial disparities found in credit terms. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2000).
[Vol. 95:669
HeinOnline -- 95 Cal. L. Rev. 710 2007
MARKET POWER AND INEQUALITY
profits. 154 The mere theoretical possibility that dealers, from time to time,
might match high vehicle profits with low markup profits offers no rebuttal to
the empirical evidence that they did not do so as a rule. 155 Certainly, no Primus
policy required dealers who marked up a loan higher to take a lower profit on
the vehicle or trade-in portion of the transaction.
It would be one thing for Priest to have argued that Primus deserved an
opportunity to show that the disparate racial impacts were counter-acted by
aspects of the transactions that were disparately favorable to blacks. Primus
almost certainly had better access to this information than the plaintiffs, who
were never given discovery information about these other aspects of the
transactions. But it is quite another thing for Priest to argue that evidence of
substantial racial markup disparities did not create a prima facie case. Even if
Teal is ignored, the showing of a disparate impact with regard to markup profits
should be sufficient, until empirically rebutted, to make out a prima facie case.
Priest's second core argument was that plaintiffs failed to prove a prima
facie case because they did not compare the markups received by "similarly
situated" white customers. Here, the central flaw in Priest's reasoning was to
ignore the difference between disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.
He expressly divorced his analysis from the elements of the case:
Q. The fact that this case was brought under a disparate impact theory
was irrelevant to your report?
A. It yeah I-it's irrelevant to the economic analysis, yes. Again, it
can't be totally irrelevant because I have to place the analysis in a
context but it doesn't-the economics don't change according to the
legal-the nature of the legal claim.
154. Cohen, supra note 85, at 9-18.
155. This possibility that dealers might accept lower profits on the "front-end" of the
transaction-by accepting a lower car price and vehicle profit-is undercut by the extreme size of
some of the markups at stake. As pointed out by plaintiffs' counsel, Clint Watkins, in his cross-
examination of Professor Priest, setting vehicle price to fully offset some of the large markups
would entail selling the car below cost:
Q. Now, is it really rational to think that a dealer would sell an automobile for, say,
$8,000 below cost because they're going to make $12,000 on the finance charge? Do
you think that's rational?
A. Sure.
Q. So, in other words, a customer can go to a dealer and buy a car $8,000 below cost.
And the next day they can go to their bank and pay it off. And the dealer just lost
$8,000; correct?
A. Well, if they pay it off immediately before the first payment, yes. Just to be precise.
Q. So if it works the way you think, this is a great opportunity for consumers in this
country to go to dealerships and let them slam them on the rate, get the car below cost,
and the next day go to their bank and pay it off. Aren't dealers simply too savvy to let
that happen, Professor?
A. I think it happens all the time, where people use equity credit lines to pay it off or
use other forms of assets to pay it off....
Priest, Primus Testimony, supra note 147, at 63. This theoretical dealership stratagem of selling a
car at a price below its cost would be truly risky in a world in which the borrower could turn
around and immediately repay the loan.
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Q. Would you agree with this statement? In preparing your report, you
completely aivorced yourself from the issue of disparate impact or
disparate treatment?
A. Yes, I tried to perform as clean and thorough an economic analysis
as I could. 156
In contrast, I expressly argued in my report and testimony that economic
analysis should flow from the elements at issue in a case:
Because disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of
discrimination have distinct elements, it is appropriate when testing for
disparate treatment and disparate impact to use distinct statistical
methods. When econometricians attempt to test for disparate racial
treatment, the goal in a regression analysis is to control for all of the
non-race variables that might have explained a particular set of
decisions. The regression asks in essence whether-after controlling
for all potential non-race variables-the race, say, of a loan applicant
determined the finance charge markup she would be asked to pay...
But tests of disparate impact require a different statistical method. Under a
disparate impact theory, it is possible for decision-making policies that are
facially race neutral to give rise to liability if they disproportionately burden the
plaintiff class. For example, a practice of charging higher finance charge
markups to applicants without a high school diploma still makes out a legal
claim if this non-race criterion results in a disparate racial impact that has no
business justification. 157
Because disparate impact has different elements than disparate treatment,
especially in that it does not require proof of intent, it is axiomatic that different
statistical tests were required.
But Priest in effect held plaintiffs to a disparate treatment standard. For
Priest, if there is no economic evidence of defendant's race-based disparate
treatment of similarly situated people, then there is no discrimination.
Plaintiffs' statistics, for example, were unpersuasive to Priest as evidence of
even dealership discrimination because these statistics failed to control for
156. Deposition of George L. Priest, Borlay et al. v. Primus Auto. Fin. Serv., No. 3-02-
0382, (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Priest, Primus Deposition], at 21-22. See also:
Q. What is your understanding as an economist that you need to know as far as the
difference between analyzing a claim based on a disparate impact theory and a claim
based on a disparate treatment theory?
A. I don't think an economist can comment on that. I don't think there's any economic-
there's nothing from economic theory that relates to that distinction.
Priest, Primus Testimony, supra note 147, at 70. And:
Q. So have you approached this case as an economist with an assumption that it was
irrelevant to your report, the fact that this is a disparate impact case?
A. Generally, it's irrelevant, yes....
Id.
157. Ayres, Primus Report, supra note 93, at 5-6.
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revenue characteristics. 58 Dealers might have been charging higher markups to
borrowers because these borrowers had higher search costs or less access to
information, and not because these borrowers were African American, Priest
argued. If disparate treatment were being alleged, Priest would have a strong
point, but in a disparate impact case, the prima facie question is whether
defendant's policies had a disparate impact on a protected class.
Indeed, while Priest did not explicitly take up my wage-gouging
hypothetical, his approach would find wage-gouging based on worker
immobility unproblematic as a matter of civil rights law. Even though the
wage-gouging was assumed to have a disparate impact against women, Priest
would not object to the policy because it would not be an example of treating
similarly situated workers differently because of their sex. That is, the
underlying differences in women's mobility would justify their differential
treatment by the employer, who would be basing his wage decisions not on
gender but on mobility.
Under the facts of these ECOA cases, the pertinent question is whether the
defendants' policies of granting dealerships selective markup discretion forced
African Americans to pay disproportionately higher markups. The answer to
this question is clearly affirmative if one simply compares the observed
markups to those that would have obtained if defendants had imposed a fixed
dollar markup as compensation for arranging loans. If Primus instead had a
policy of compensating $500 (or any other fixed dollar markup) on each loan,
there would have been no racial disparities in the markups paid. 159 Priest
158. For example, Priest testified:
Q. Would you agree that one of the major differences in opinions held between you and
Dr. Ayres is that you disagree that markup is revenue based and that you believe that it
is more cost based? Would that be fair, at least to describe one of the primary
differences between the two of you?
A. Yes. I think that's fair.
Priest, Primus Testimony, supra note 147, at 33.
159. This counterfactual also suggests that the causation requirement should merely be that
the defendant's policy was a but-for cause of the disparity, not that the defendant's policy was the
sole but-for cause of the disparity. Even if the plaintiffs' unwillingness to educate themselves was
also a but-for cause, a defendant whose policy is a cause of the disparity should still be liable. In
antitrust, courts never inquire whether anticompetitive harm caused by defendant conduct is
somehow excused by consumers' contributory negligence. William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions
for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 652, 674 (1983) ("there should be no defense of
contributory negligence"). In Griggs, the Supreme Court never suggested that the failure of
applicants to earn a high school diploma might have undermined proof that Duke Power's policy
caused a disparity. 401 U.S. at 432-33. See Peter Siegleman, Two-Party Disparate Impact in
Employment Discrimination Law (Working Paper Oct. 28, 2005) (on file with author).
If an individual lender offered dealers a flat-fee compensation, some dealers may try to find
other lenders for their customers who would be willing to pay a supra-competitive APR. But as
Mark Cohen has observed:
[T]here might also be ways to reduce this leakage. For example, bonuses can be offered
for dealers that provide more than a certain percentage of their loans to the captive
lender. This approach is already used by some captives.
Cohen, supra note 85, at 15. See also Ayres, GMAC Report, supra note 125 (arguing that
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avoided the compelling prima facie evidence of a disparate racial impact by
insisting that all economic analysis of discrimination must be an analysis of
disparate treatment. 160  Priest's disparate treatment standard would force
plaintiffs to control for a seemingly endless array of non-race factors that might
have caused dealers to charge higher markups.
E. What the Litigation has Wrought
The Primus claims went to a bench trial in March 2005 before Judge Aleta
Trauger in the Middle District of Tennessee. Shortly after the end of trial,
Judge Trauger ruled from the bench: "What I have decided is that the plaintiffs
have proved their case and that they will win in my decision,"'1 61 Judge Trauger
ordered the parties to attempt to reach a remedy or settlement in the matter, but
warned the parties that if they did not reach a settlement, she would structure a
remedy. 162 At the time this Article was written, the parties had been unable to
reach an agreement and the court had ordered mediation.' 
63
Stepping back, there is a strong likelihood that this litigation has reshaped
loan pricing throughout the industry.164 The following table 165 shows some of
lenders can also retard dealer incentive to switch to other lenders by explicitly advertising that
their loans will not be marked up).
160. James Heckman similarly conflated the requirements of disparate treatment and
disparate impact:
Professor Ayres characterizes his report as a theory of how economists should
test for the existence of racial discrimination in automobile credit rate spreads. The
main premise of Professor Ayres' theory is that in testing for such a disparity,
economists should ignore the impact of all characteristics of the vehicle dealer and
the vehicle buyer (except for race) who negotiate the transactions and of all factors
that might affect the disparity. Thus Professor Ayres would have the economist
ignore all of the factors that govern whether a disparity exists between similarly
situated individuals. The only exception Professor Ayes allows is for variables that
meet his definition of 'legitimate business need' for either GMAC or the dealer.
Heckman, GMAC Report, supra note 125, at 2. Heckman's insistence on comparing
'similarly situated" borrowers commits the same error as Priest; it imposes the requirements of
disparate treatment on a disparate impact case. As Heckman sees, I would only require a
comparison of borrowers who are similarly situated with regard to plausible business
justifications. The plaintiffs in Griggs without high school diplomas were not similarly situated
with the promoted applicants who held high school diplomas-and according to Priest and
Heckman, should be excluded from the analysis. But the applicants with and without diplomas
were similarly situated for the purposes of a disparate impact test because the Supreme Court
found that conditioning employment on a high school diploma was not a valid business
justification.
161. Excerpt of Proceedings Volume A, Borlay v. Primus Auto. Fin., No. 3:02-0382 (M.D.
Tenn. Mar. 16, 2005), available at http://www.tnmd.uscourts.gov/borlay.pdf.
162. Id. See order to negotiate remedy, available at http://www.tnmd.uscourts.gov/
borlay.pdf.
163. Joint Status Report, Borlay v. Primus Auto. Fin., No. 3-02-0382 (M.D. Tenn. May 27,
2005), available at http://www.tnmd.uscourts.gov/borlay20050527.pdf.
164. Mark Cohen has similarly analyzed the impact of the litigation on the lending market.
Cohen, supra note 85.
165. The Table is taken from Cohen, supra note 85, tbl. 9.
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the major events in the litigation:
Table 2
TIME LINE MARKUP CAPS
Pre-Litigation No CAPS at GMAC, FMCC, PRIMUS, Bank One
NNMAC had 3% to 5% cap
AHFC 2% to 3.5% cap
GMAC and NMAC Litigation Filed
-February 1998
Uncertain date - post Feb. 1998 PRIMUS institutes cap from 2% to 5%
NMAC Report
May 17, 2001
August 15, 2001 GMAC introduces first rate cap = 4%
August 2002 GMAC lowers cap to 3%
November 1, 2002 FMCC introduces first rate cap = 3%
NMAC Settlement NMAC agreed to cap of 2% to 2.5%
February 18, 2003
March 1, 2003 PRIMUS lowers top cap from 5% to 3% (2%)
GMAC Settlement GMAC agreed to cap of 2% to 2.5 %
February 10, 2004
Post-GMAC Settlement PRIMUS lowers top cap to 2.5%
Note: Other lenders had markup caps and many of them changed
the caps with similar patterns to those shown here.
Before the class action suit was filed, many of the lenders (including Ford
Motor Credit and GMAC) placed no limits on the amount by which dealerships
could mark up some of their loans. But since 2001, a series of lenders have
adopted successively lower markup caps. 166 Professor Heckman attributes
some of these industry movements to the impact of the litigation and in fact the
ideas at the heart of this Article:
[Ayres'] advocacy has been influential in public debate and has been
persuasive enough to induce defendants to settle some large cases.
[H]is doctrines are likely to transform distribution practices of the
automobile industry. 
167
The import of the litigation is also evident in the type of policy changes that
have occurred. Instead of across the board caps, many lenders have recently
begun imposing smaller caps on extended term loans or loans over a certain
dollar amount, which disproportionately burden minority borrowers.' 68 Most
166. See, e.g., Opinion: California Sounds Strict Warning on Finance Reserve,
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, July 28, 2003.
167. Bomholz & Heckman, supra note 125, at 3.
168. See, e.g., TRUSTMARK RATE SHEET (May 1, 2004) (setting 1% markup on certain
loans between 67 and 72 months). See also Nowadays, F&I Should Mean Fair and Impartial,
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Jan. 12, 2004, at 12 ("Most responsible banks and finance companies are
capping the finance reserve at three percentage points."); Cut To the Quick: Rate caps have little
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captive finance companies, banks, and other reputable finance sources have
imposczd reasonable limits of 3% on the finance reserve. 169 The industry
publication, Automotive News, recently opined:
Disclosure isn't required by federal regulations. But if the dealership
discloses its share of the deal - which at 3 points or less is a reasonable
fee for service - there's no moral problem. It's just business. If the
customer knows what's going on, everything is fine...
As always, honesty is the only policy. 1
70
Indeed, some participants now see an almost inevitable movement toward
flat-fee compensation. 1
.Mark Cohen has estimated that the settlements to date may benefit more
than 1.4 million African American car financers, in an amount of more than
800 million dollars. 72 Minority consumers benefit not only from the reduced
caps, but also from defendants' promises to offer "pre-approval, no markup
loans" to African Americans and Hispanics. 173 These "no markup" loans
represent a kind of racial set-aside that is unusual in disparate impact
settlements. Normally if a defendant's race-neutral policy has an unjustified
disparate racial impact, the defendant substitutes another race-neutral policy. 1
74
effect on loan profits already clipped by sharp competition among lenders, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS,
Dec. 1, 2003, at 40.
169. Cut to the Quick, supra note 168, at 40.
170. See Opinion: California Sounds, supra note 166.
171. Press Release, The Rikess Group & Dixon Hughes, Dealers Say Automotive Retail
Lenders have Strong Case for Eliminating Interest Rate Mark-ups on Customer Financing, (Oct.
11, 2004), available at http://www.rikessgroup.com/pdf/2004Oct-TRGDHPress%20Release.pdf
(stating that "dealers predict that replacing interest rate markups with flat fee financing will yield a
great many benefits for their customers, business operations, and the industry").
172. Telephone conversation between Ian Ayres and Mark Cohen (Nov. 13, 2005)
(discussing estimates that Cohen prepared in connection with final settlement of GMAC, AHFC,
NMAC, Chrysler, Bank One, U.S. Bank and Bank of America litigation). This estimate probably
represents a maximum potential benefit-as some minorities may not take advantage of the no
markup loans or dealers may substitute toward less constrained lenders (although the latter
strategy is constrained by the industry-wide cap reductions).
173. The details of the promise are described by the Wall St. Journal:
Under such arrangements, auto lenders try to identify the race of potential applicants
using ZIP codes or various databases that contain the details of previous loans they
have issued. Once the race is established, the lender can send an offer of credit to the
potential applicant. The offer discloses the annual percentage rate that the applicant
qualifies for, which can't then be marked up at a dealership.
Lee Hawkins, Jr., Honda, Three Banks Settle Loan-Bias Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2005, at
D2.
174. Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, 7 F.3d 795,799 (8th Cir. 1993), is one of the few
cases in which a court ordered a race-contingent remedy. The claim was that the defendant
employer's no-beard policy had an unjustified disparate impact against African American
employees who disproportionately "suffered from pseudofolliculitis barbae ('PFB'), a skin
condition affecting approximately fifty percent of African American males." Id. at 796. But
instead of enjoining the policy with regard to any employee who suffered from PFB, the opinion
only required the employer to make an "exception to its no-beard policy for African American
males who suffer from PFB." Id. at 799. See Jolls, supra note 2, at 658.
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Thus, for example, if an employment exam was proscribed for having an
unjustified disparate impact, a settlement would normally require substitution
of an alternative race-neutral exam, not a special exam for minority applicants.
But under the guise of "affirmative lending" regulation, 175 the litigants agreed
to minority "no markup" set-asides.' 76 This innovation made it a lot easier for
the parties to reach agreement. The class representatives and their attorneys
could assure that minority borrowers would have greater access to no markup
loans, but defendants would retain an (albeit reduced) ability to extract supra-
competitive profits from white borrowers.
But the markup caps contained in the class settlements have also benefited
consumers outside the plaintiff class. The reduced caps have saved white
borrowers a bundle. 177 Civil rights remedies are sometime seen as a zero-sum
game. That is, if a court orders defendants to hire more minorities or women, it
will often be at the expense of whites or men. But in this context, the plaintiff
class of African Americans has saved white borrowers hundreds of millions of
dollars in loan markups.' 78 Many people have been critical of the disparate
impact cause of action. 179 But the automobile litigation is one area where it has
succeeded greatly, both in ending a racially discriminatory policy and in
protecting all consumers from a predatory lending practice.
CONCLUSION
On one level, the subject of this Article is an important but narrow
question of disparate impact law---defining the appropriate contours of the
business justification defense. I have suggested that anti-competitive conduct
by a defendant should not provide a business justification defense in disparate
impact litigation, even if the conduct increases the defendant's profits. Policies
that increase a firm's profits by assuring that the firm covers its costs are
presumptively justified, but policies that increase a firm's profits above the
competitive level do not justify disparate racial impacts. Wage-gouging is
simply not a business necessity.
On another level, this Article aims to establish a firmer footing for
disparate impact theories that do more than reveal hidden disparate
treatment.1 80 Under the conception of hidden disparate treatment, any showing
175. Race-dependent "affirmative lending" programs are explicitly countenanced as
potential means to remedy "discrimination": A lender may be permitted to establish a "special
purpose credit program" in which "all program participants may be required to share one or more
common characteristics (for example, race ... )." ECOA Reg. 12 C.F.R. § 202.8(b)(2).
176. See Hawkins, supra note 173, at D2.
177. See Cohen, Primus Report, supra note 95, at 45 (noting that under a markup cap,
average charge for whites went down from $513 to $311).
178. Id.
179. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV.
701 (2006).
180. Some courts have adopted the tactic as well. See, e.g., Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 255
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that a policy was motivated by profit and not prejudice should be sufficient to
avoid liability. Even a price-gouging motive would seem sufficient to absolve a
decision-maker of the wrong of intentional discrimination and hence undermine
the basis of any disparate impact suit. This Article has challenged that
conception. Not all increases in profitability are equal. 181 Or, in the words of
Priest and Heckman, not all profits are "similarly situated."'182 A policy that
moves a firm from a sub-competitive level toward the competitive level of
profits deserves more leeway than a policy that extracts huge, anti-competitive
profits from consumers or workers.
At times, advocates of stronger civil rights enforcement have argued,
reasonably, that firms should be forced to accept some modest reduction in
profits to reduce the disparate impact of their policies. But their mistake has
been in tacitly accepting that policies that generate bigger profits are
presumptively more justified. Distinguishing pro-competitive increments to
profits (those that let firms cover their costs) from anti-competitive increments
to profits (those that let firms raise the price above their costs) challenges this
unconditional deference to the normative reasonableness of profitability.
Through this lens we can now see that a policy that generates bigger anti-
competitive profits is presumptively less justified. A defendant who comes into
court and says it needs to maintain a policy because the policy permits the firm
to gouge its employees' wages is making a less compelling argument than a
defendant who says it needs to maintain a policy because the policy keeps the
firm from losing money.
Civil rights advocates have been reluctant to attack this profitability issue
head on. In attacking particular policies, plaintiffs' attorneys have at times
relied on strained arguments that challenged corporate policies as being simply
irrational or irrelevant by arguing that certain policies have either no impact or
a negative impact on a firm's profits. But the idea that firms adopt policies that
F.3d 615, 625-26 (8th Cir. 2001); In re Employment Discrimination Litig. Against Ala., et al., 198
F.3d 1305, 1316-17 (1 th Cir. 1999).
181. This broader conception of disparate impact resonates with that adopted by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens in a pair of decisions. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 669-70 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1001-04 (1988) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). They objected that non-shifting disparate
impact burdens (which were later displaced by the shifting burdens of the Civil Rights Act of
1991) were inconsistent with the independent wrong of disparate racial impacts:
In their view, business necessity was an affirmative defense to be proved by
defendants after plaintiffs had successfully established the legal injury of disparate
impact. Once a disparate impact had been shown, an employer might be excused
from liability on a showing of legitimate motive, but no showing at all about the
employer's motive was necessary for liability to be imposed.
Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV.
493, 522 (2003).
182. Heckman, GMAC Report, supra note 125, at 2. See discussion supra text
accompanying notes 155-156.
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systematically hurt their profits is often implausible to those of us with an
economist's mindset. It tends to lead back toward the idea of conscious
disparate treatment driving policies that sacrifice profits in favor of
discriminatory preferences. The unwillingness of plaintiffs' attorneys to
challenge profitable policies that produce disparate impact thus reinforces the
idea that disparate impact liability was meant to merely supplement disparate
treatment liability. 1
83
Finally, this Article is an invitation to think more about competition and
consumer protection law from a civil rights perspective. Inequality and anti-
competitiveness often go hand in hand. The ECOA litigation against the major
automotive lenders is a vivid case in point. But it is part of a far greater "the
poor pay more" phenomenon. It is not a coincidence that antitrust and civil
rights share a common concern--discrimination. Price discrimination and
disparate-impact discrimination are often related. It is not a misuse of disparate
impact law to restrict anti-competitive conduct that has a disparate impact. And
it would not be a misuse of competition or consumer protection law to restrict
disparate impacts that are caused by anti-competitive conduct. 184
183. Richard Primus has argued against the idea that "disparate impact doctrine is merely
an evidentiary dragnet designed to catch clandestine intentional discriminators":
[A]dopting that idea would erase the theory of Griggs, which . . . . spoke
explicitly about a concern with self-perpetuating racial hierarchies,
hierarchies that could persist even in the absence of new discriminatory acts.
As a matter of descriptive interpretation, it is problematic to interpret a
doctrine in a way that so thoroughly ignores the fullest (and founding)
judicial statement of that doctrine. As a matter of policy, and on the
understanding (which I endorse) that the Griggs rationale is normatively
desirable, it is problematic to choose an interpretation of Title VII that is
wholly about present deliberate discrimination, given that history and de
facto segregation remain relevant to the conditions of racial hierarchy in the
workplace. To be sure, an honest assessment of the doctrine might require
such a reading if Congress had endorsed Wards Cove in 1991. But the 1991
Act is a rejection of the Court's Wards Cove direction.
See Primus, supra note 181, at 523 (discussing different plausible goals underlying disparate
impact cause of action). Policies might also be misguided because of unconscious bias or other
cognitive distortions. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161
(1995); Charles Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Amy Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74
IND. L.J. 1129 (1999). But the resistance of corporations to such litigation suggests that profits are
often at stake.
184. The intentionally fluid phrase "unfair or deceptive" in the FTC and baby FTC Acts,
see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(1) (2000); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349 et seq. (McKinney 2002); Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq., (or even the common-law standards for contractual "bad
faith" and "unconscionability") might evolve to encompass disproportionate profit-taking from
minorities. For example, consider Connecticut's contretemps with Acme RentaCar. See Ian Ayres
& Barry Nalebuff, Connecticut's Speeder-Friendly Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2001, at
A 19. There, the State of Connecticut went after Acme for charging a $150 penalty for driving
more than 80 miles per hour. The State challenged the policy on consumer protection grounds-
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arguing that it was an unfair and deceptive practice to profit from a liquidated damages provision.
Am. Car Rental, Inc. v. Comm'r of Consumer Prot., 273 Conn. 296 (2005). But this Article
suggests that the State might have alternatively challenged the unfairness of the practice as
disproportionately extracting rents from minority customers. Of course, the
disparate impact would have to be proved, but I recall that several of the people who were
originally reported to be victims of the practice were African American. See, e.g.,
James Turner v. Am. Car Rental, Inc., 92 Conn. App. 123 (2005);
http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/research/1161417.html?page=2;
http://www.cbc.ca/consumers/market/files/cars/gps/index.html. I would not be surprised to learn
that there are a variety of backend fees that are disproportionately borne by minority customers.
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